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ABSTRACT 
 
 
RED, WHITE, AND BLACK: ANTI-COMMUNISM, MASSIVE RESISTANCE, 
AND THE CASE OF ORVAL FAUBUS 
 
Özdemir, Fatma Doğuş 
MA, Department of History 
Supervisor: Assistant Professor Dr. Edward P. Kohn 
September, 2008 
 
 
In 1954, The Supreme Court of the United States declared in the Brown v. 
Board of Education decision that racial segregation in the nation’s public schools 
was against the U.S. Constitution. In the South, where racial segregation was the 
norm, the decision triggered a region wide reaction called the Massive Resistance. 
The resistance movement also coincided with the domestic anti-communist 
consensus of the Cold War, but the historical southern tendency to brand racial 
reform as communistic was more central. One focus of the thesis is this continuity. 
The other focus is on how a moderate Upper South state, Arkansas, became the site 
of the greatest Massive Resistance crisis in 1957 over the integration of the Little 
Rock High School, owing to the anti-communist and segregationist propaganda 
emanating from the Deep South. Although the movement was initiated by a 
conservative white elite, the support of local southern community and the 
intimidation of moderately inclined white southerners, was a key to its success. In 
reaching down to grassroots and pushing moderacy to inactivity, the combination of 
an anti-communist and anti-integrationist rhetoric had specific importance in 
 iv 
 
Arkansas. It was with such combination that the resistance could contribute greatly to 
the building up of the 1957 integration crisis in Little Rock, by mostly mobilizing the 
otherwise silent grassroots and by giving the previously moderate Governor Orval 
Faubus an opportunity to assert a new and more acceptable conservative stance. To 
get down to local circumstances personal papers of southern leaders, mostly 
including propaganda material, Faubus’s personal papers and autobiographies, and 
memoirs of Arkansas figures were consulted, as well as secondary sources. 
Keywords: Anti-communism, Massive Resistance, Arkansas, Little Rock Crisis, 
Orval Faubus, Southern Conservatism. 
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ÖZET 
 
 
KIZIL, BEYAZ, VE SİYAH: ANTİ-KOMÜNİZM,  KİTLESEL DİRENİŞ VE 
ORVAL FAUBUS 
 
Özdemir, Fatma Doğuş 
Yüksek Lisans, Tarih Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yardımcı Doçent Dr. Edward P. Kohn 
Eylül 2007 
 
 
1954’te ABD Temyiz Mahkemesi, aldığı bir kararla ülke çapında devlet 
okullarında ırka dayalı ayrımcılığı anayasaya aykırı bulmuştur. Bu karar, ırksal 
ayrımcılığın çoğunlukla toplum düzeninin temel bir parçası olduğu güney 
eyaleterinde, Kitlesel Direniş olarak adlandırılan, bölgesel çapta bir hareketi 
tetiklemiştir. Bu direniş hareketi, Soğuk Savaş’ın getirdiği ulusal anti-komünist görüş 
birliği ile zamansal olarak örtüşse de, güneydeki tarihsel eğilim zaten ırksal reform 
çabalarını komünizm ile bağdaştırma yönündeydi. Bu tezde üzerine eğilinen bir konu 
söz konusu tarihsel sürekliliktir. Diğer bir konu ise, önceleri ılımlı olan Yukarı 
Güney eyaleti Arkansas’nın, 1957’de Little Rock Lisesi’nin entegrasyonu sırasında 
yaşanan krizle, Kitlesel Direniş’in merkezi konumuna gelmesidir.  Bu değişimde, 
Merkez Güney’den yayılan anti-komünist ve ayrımcı propaganda büyük rol 
oynamıştır. Direniş hareketi Muhafazakâr beyaz bir seçkin zümre tarafından 
başlatılmış olsa da, güneyli yerel halkın desteği ve ılımlı eğilimlere sahip beyaz 
güneyli liderlere göz dağı verilmesi hareketin başarısındaki temel etken olmuştur. 
Direnişçi söylemin Arkansas’ya ulaşarak tabana hitap edebilmesinde ve eyaletteki 
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ılımlı kesimi pasifize etmesinde, aynı anda anti-komünist ve ayrımcı olan söylemin 
etkisi özellikle önem kazanmıştır. Bu bileşim sayesinde direniş, 1957 entegrasyon 
krizinin doğmasında önemli bir etken olmuştur ve aksi takdirde sessiz kalabilecek 
olan tabanı hareketlendirerek önceleri ılımlı olan vali Orval Faubus’u yeni, 
muhafazakâr ve toplumda kolay kabul görebilecek bir duruşu benimsemeye sevk 
etmiştir. Yerel koşulları kavrayabilmek amacıyla, ikincil kaynaklara ek olarak, 
güneyli liderlerin daha çok propaganda malzemeleri içeren kişisel koleksiyonlarının 
yanı sıra, Faubus’un özel koleksiyonu ile otobiyografileri ve Arkansas’da öne çıkan 
kişilerin basılmış hatıralarına başvurulmuştur.  
Anahtar Kelimeler: Anti-komünizm, Kitlesel Direniş, Arkansas, Little Rock Krizi, 
Orval Faubus, Amerika’nın güneyindeki muhafazakârlık. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In May 17, 1954, the Supreme Court of the United States rendered the most 
critical decision in terms of race relations in the country, with Brown v. Board of 
Education. The decision declared unconstitutional the racial segregation in public 
schools, which had long been practiced in the South since the 1896 Plessy v. 
Ferguson decision that had allowed the separation of the races “in equal terms.” The 
decision touched a very fundamental aspect of Southern life at a critical time, and 
thus resulted in a region wide reaction, referred to as the Massive Resistance.  
In August, 1954, in response to the decision, Virginia governor Thomas B. 
Stanley appointed a commission on public education headed by Senator Garland 
Gray, with a gradual and moderate program of accepting token desegregation and 
leaving the implementation to local authorities. However, even before a 
constitutional convention met, Senator Harry Flood Byrd had successfully advertised 
the passage of an interposition resolution by the legislature. He had “issued a call for 
‘massive resistance’ to desegregation, and an all-out defense of white supremacy had 
become the dominant theme of Virginia politics.” And in early February 1956, the 
Virginia general assembly approved an interposition resolution, Stanley announced 
  2 
his support of interposition, and the Gray Commission discarded its gradualist local 
provisions, bringing them into alignment with the governor’s position.1  
This doctrine soon spread to legislatures of other states; and as Massive 
Resistance gained prominence and regional unity was established, the southern 
congressional delegation announced in March 1956, a “Declaration of Constitutional 
Principles”. Known as the Southern Manifesto, the declaration was signed by 19 of 
the southern states’ 22 senators and 82 of its 106 representatives. It embraced 
interposition declaring the Brown decision unconstitutional. 2  Preservation of the 
racial status quo lay at the heart of the reaction; however, this legal reaction 
depended heavily on constitutional arguments and favored states’ rights against the 
centralized power of the federal government. Indeed, the rhetoric employed by the 
leaders of the resistance, reflected a varying range of ideas. One of the most 
prominent of these was anti-communism, which by 1954 had a nationwide resonance 
as well. Moreover, the most prominent Massive Resistance crisis happened at a time 
that coincided with the high tide of the Cold War, in 1957, in Little Rock, Arkansas. 
This thesis will thus be looking into the ways in which anti-communism and forces 
of Massive Resistance played out in Arkansas. Such background to the crisis reveals 
several formerly unnoticed conditions about the crisis. The particular combination of 
anti-communist and segregationist rhetoric of the Massive Resistance contributed 
greatly to the building up of the crisis, by both easily appealing to the grassroots 
prejudices and by pushing the moderate state officials to the right of the political 
spectrum – Governor Orval Faubus being the foremost. 
                                               
1
 Numan V. Bartley, A History of the South: The New South 1945-1980, (Texas: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1995), 193-94.  
2
 Ibid., 198. Interposition was the legal procedure that had been adopted back in the Virginia 
Resolution of 1798 and revived during the Massive Resistance. It enabled the states to nullify federal 
laws which they consider as unconstitutionally undermining states’ rights. 
  3 
As to the historical context in which the Brown decision triggered the 
Massive Resistance, especially for the South, it was a time of insecurity in the face of 
change, and southern states resisted the ruling with arguments extending beyond 
mere white supremacy. At the same time that the region was undergoing economic 
and social changes such as industrialization and urbanization in the post World War 
II period; the civil rights movement was gaining momentum and the federal 
government was increasingly acting in its favor. Southerners already had doubts 
about the social and racial liberalism of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal, 
despite the overall support for his wartime policy. It was in the late 1930s that forces 
of white southern conservatism began to rise against New Deal policies’ 
undermining of states’ rights and the region’s racial order. 3  Harry S. Truman’s 
presidency went on feeding southern fears. In 1946, he issued the Executive Order 
9008 to create the President’s Committee on Civil Rights. In 1947, he issued a 
formal report entitled “To Secure These Rights” that called nationwide for protecting 
civil rights. In the presidential election of 1948, he declared his support to a 
permanent Fair Employment Protection Commission, anti-lynching legislation, anti-
poll tax laws, and measures to end discrimination in interstate transportation 
facilities.4 This resulted in the breaking of the Democratic Party, with a southern 
faction forming the third party under Strom Thurmond’s leadership. Dwight D. 
Eisenhower was elected in 1952 with a conservative stance against the “softness” of 
Truman both in terms of anti-communism and in matters of race. However he would 
disappoint white southerners during the crisis in Little Rock, although he opposed 
desegregation of the armed forces in 1948, resisted federal intervention in racial 
                                               
3
 Jeff Woods, Black Struggle, Red Scare: Segregation and Anti-Communism in the South, 1948-1968. 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2004), 24-25.  
4
 Ibid., 35. 
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issues since 1953, refused to endorse the 1954 Brown decision, and declared in 1956 
that racial issues were “matters of the heart not of legislation.” 
Moreover, beginning with late 1940s, a series of Supreme Court cases had 
already begun chipping away at segregation, feeding white southerners’ perception 
about the Court’s revolutionary and even tyrannical nature. In the 1948 Sipuel v. 
Board of Regents decision, the Court reaffirmed its 1938 decision in the Missouri 
Gaines case. In 1938 Lloyd Gaines was denied admission to University of Missouri 
Law School, because of his race. The state did not have a separate law school for 
blacks, but just provided tuition for those who wanted to study elsewhere. When he 
brought suit, with the help of the National Association for the Advancement of the 
Colored People, the court ruled that “the state either provide a ‘separate but equal’ 
law school or admit Gaines to the white school.”5 Sipuel v. Board of Regents was a 
similar case involving the University of Oklahoma Law School. In 1950, three more 
cases that threatened institutionalized white supremacy followed. Herman Sweatt 
applied to the University of Texas Law School and was denied admission, again 
because of his race. Unlike the situation in Oklahoma and Missouri, Texas opted for 
creating a separate law school for blacks. This time Sweatt’s lawyers attacked the 
practice of segregation, claiming that “Sweatt’s constitutional right of equal 
protection of the laws could be satisfied only by admission to the state university.” 
The Court determined that the separate law school was never close to being equal to 
the white one, and ordered the admission of Sweatt to the white law school. Thus in 
Sweatt v. Painter, the court came very close to destroying the “separate but equal” 
doctrine. Mclaurin v. Board of Regents and Henderson v. United States were the two 
others handed down on the same day, June 5, 1950. In McLaurin, after the University 
                                               
5
 Numan V. Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance: Race and Politics in the South During the 
1950’s (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969), 5. 
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of Oklahoma began admitting black students in alignment with the Sipuel decision, 
the Court upheld graduate student G. W. MacLaurin’s pleas that segregated facilities 
in the campus denied equality before the law. In Henderson, it prohibited segregation 
on railway dining cars.6 
The period also coincided with the high tide of the Cold War in the 
international arena and its culmination in the domestic sphere with the rising tide of 
anti-communism. In 1946, at the same time that Winston Churchill made his “Iron 
Curtain” speech, the United States Chamber of Commerce distributed two hundred 
copies of a pamphlet entitled “Communist Infiltration in the United States,” and the 
Canadian government uncovered a Soviet spy ring. The following year Truman 
announced his containment policy, and around the same time the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation and the House Un-American Activities Committee intensified their 
hunt on domestic subversion. A series of espionage cases, such as the Alger Hiss 
case of 1948, Klaus Fuchs case of 1949, and that of the Rosenbergs in 1951, and the 
rise in national politics of Senator Joseph McCarthy, were simultaneous with such 
international Cold War developments as the Communist victory in China, the fall of 
Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union’s detonation of the Atomic Bomb, and the 
deployment of American troops to Korea.7 The south had an important role to play, 
both in the conservative coalition that brought Eisenhower’s presidential victory in 
1952 and the anti-communist consensus that had taken hold by then. Federal 
institutions such as FBI and HUAC, and other similar committees, were either 
dominated by or paid considerable attention to conservative Southern Democrats 
who saw a communist conspiracy behind the crystallization of the civil rights 
movement and the federal support they enjoyed.  
                                               
6
 Ibid., 5-6.  
7
 M. J. Heale, American Anticommunism: Combating the Enemy Within, 1830-1970, (Baltimore and 
London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1990), 132-154.  
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This latter context added a significant element to the revival of southern 
solidarity in defense of preserving the racial status quo. It gave the advocates of 
resistance an effective weapon. The south already had an exceptionally strong anti-
radical, anti-outsider, and anti-communist tradition, which supplied the political 
leadership of the resistance with an already receptive public. During the mid-fifties, 
anti-communism increasingly became an important part of the rhetoric employed by 
southern leaders, greatly strengthening the effectiveness of segregationist 
propaganda, at a time in which an overtly and solely racist rhetoric would be less 
effective. This thesis will evaluate the use of anti-communism by southern resisters 
in the post-Brown era, showing first the deep-rooted nature of a southern brand of 
anti-communism, merged with ideas of white supremacy, through historical 
continuities. Then, variations will be revealed through the specific ways in which it 
was integrated into broader Massive Resistance rhetoric; such as the defense of 
states’ rights, the Constitution, and white supremacy. Finally, it will conclude by 
examining the ways in which this rhetoric contributed to the Little Rock crisis in 
Arkansas.  
The Massive Resistance movement materialized especially after the 1955 
ruling that brought a gradualist approach to the implementation of the 1954 decision, 
assigning responsibility for desegregation plans to local school boards. Right after 
the first Brown decision, the Deep South states initiated the wave of propaganda that 
urged a legislative resistance strategy to take hold in the whole region by the time the 
second decision that regulated the implementation of the first came, and that 
eventually resulted in the “Southern Manifesto”. The Deep South also became the 
center for the dissemination of segregationist and anti-communist ideology. 
However, it was mostly the states of the Upper South that eventually determined the 
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long-term direction of the movement, with a more hesitant and prudent attitude. The 
severity of anti-communism’s deployment as a weapon seemed to be directly 
proportional to the extremity of the segregationist rhetoric. Thus, while it was more 
obvious and outspoken in the Deep South, it was more complicated and its impact 
uncertain in the periphery where forces of moderation were more at stake. Still, the 
Massive Resistance manifested itself in 1957 in an upper south state, with the most 
notable and internationally acknowledged Massive Resistance crisis of the Cold War 
era. The crisis over integration of Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas, 
brought the Federal Government and a southern State in direct conflict. And 
Arkansas governor Orval Eugene Faubus opted for resistance.  
Although Arkansas suddenly turned into a stronghold of Massive Resistance 
with the crisis, before the incident it had been one of the most moderate states in the 
south in terms of race relations. While important victories that contributed most to 
the rise of Massive Resistance politics were taking place in the Deep South – that of 
the leading segregationist and anti-communist Herman Talmadge in Georgia, and of 
the strongest anti-Truman and anti-integration force in the region James F. Byrnes in 
South Carolina – liberal politics could survive in the State. Right after the Supreme 
Court handed down the Brown decision in 1954, Faubus’s predecessor Francis 
Cherry had already announced that Arkansas would not defy the order. Although 
Faubus’s own personal history as well did not point to a prejudice against blacks, he 
eventually became the icon of Massive Resistance in 1957. An anti-communist 
sentiment combined with the forces of Massive Resistance working in the 
background seemed to contribute greatly to Faubus’s unexpected segregationist 
stance during the crisis. Moreover his own personal ambitions and the specific 
conditions of the Arkansas atmosphere were other ingredients that fed the eventual 
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crisis. As will be demonstrated with the Arkansas example too, it is important to pay 
close attention to what happened on the local level to come to a better understanding 
of both the Massive Resistance and southern anti-communism. On the local level, 
even personalities and their interaction with their specific constituencies played an 
important role. Looking at local politics would also contribute to a better 
comprehension of events, such as the Little Rock integration crisis, that had 
important implications in the broader issues of national politics such as the Civil 
Rights Movement, McCarthyism, and even the Cold War.  
Up until the 1990s in American historiography, white southern resistance to 
desegregation was studied mostly as a side issue within the historiography of the 
Civil Rights Movement, thus mostly in isolation with issues such as domestic anti-
communism or the Cold War, which had their own treatment in a wholly separate 
historiographical realm.8  Historians of the civil rights movement, as Charles W. 
Eagles points out, “have tended to emphasize one side of the struggle, the movement 
side, and to neglect their professional obligation to understand the other side, the 
segregationist side.”9 He noted that it was after a burst of books around 1970 that 
historians and other academics began to dominate the field and the two most 
prominent southern historians included were Numan V. Bartley and Neil R. 
McMillen, whose works did offer a significant insight into the opposition to the 
movement.10  
                                               
8
 The best account that got down to the locality of domestic anti-communism was M. J. Heale, 
McCarthy’s Americans: Red Scare Politics in State and Nation, 1935-1965, (London: McMillan Press 
Ltd., 1998). Heale also studied southern anti-communism and its importance in the national red scare, 
by focusing on Georgia. Another useful account tracing the anticommunism as a long tradition was 
Joel Kovel, Red Hunting in the Promised Land: Anticommunism and the Making of America, (New 
York: Perseus Book Group, 1994).  
9
 Charles W. Eagles, “Toward New Histories of the Civil Rights Era,” Journal of Southern History, 
Vol. 66, No. 4. (Nov., 2000), pp.815-848, 816. 
10
 Numan V. Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance: Race and Politics in the South During the 
1950’s (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969); Neil R. McMillen, The Citizens’ 
Council: Organized Resistance to the Second Reconstruction, 1954-64 (Urbana, Chivago: University 
  9 
Numan V. Bartley’s 1969 book on the Massive Resistance is an extensive 
study that gave a whole account of the consolidation and rise of conservative 
southern politics during the 1950s.11 He placed in his work a considerable emphasis 
on the anti-communist propaganda that the political leadership of the resistance 
undertook by talking about how the political leadership placed anti-communist 
charges into the resistance propaganda, especially during the mid 1950s, when their 
aspirations grew to include nationalized arguments. Bartley briefly focused on the 
legislative and investigative committees in various states, whose efforts to discredit 
racial reform as part of a communist conspiracy, “went hand-in-hand with 
interposition and with neobourbon efforts to oppose progressive policies on the 
national political level.”12  In his account, however, both the Massive Resistance 
movement and its use of anti-communism, was treated on the whole as a monolith 
and highly organized effort, led by a group of conscious elites. Although he noted the 
existence of southern dissent within the movement and the limitations brought by 
urbanization and corporate business, his account lacked the varieties, complexities 
and failures that reveal themselves when specific locales and persons are at focus.  
Neil McMillen’s detailed focus on The Citizens’ Councils was 
complementary of Bartley’s work, in that he revealed the variety of the resistance.13 
                                                                                                                                     
of Illinois Press, 1971). Another work in the same light was L. A. Newby, Challenge to the Court: 
Social Scientists and Defense of Segregation, 1954-1966 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1967). 
11
 His main argument was that the South could not adjust itself to the quick economic and 
demographic changes that took place in the mid century in a manner that increasingly threatened a 
basic southern social system, segregation. Thus it responded by attaching itself more and more to an 
inherited southern identity and launching “a determined program of ‘massive resistance’… [which 
was led by a group of] politicians and political activists… [whose] outlook was in the tradition of 
nineteenth century bourbonism” He named this leading elite, ‘the neobourbons’, resembling their 
organization and resistance to desegregation to the nineteenth century southern elites that had resisted 
the post Civil War Reconstruction. See Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance, 17. 
12
 Ibid., 189. He explained the actions of these state organizations, along with “a southern 
informational offensive”, accompanied by the Citizens’ Councils that contributed greatly to the 
dissemination of anti-communist propaganda. 
13
 Intensively studying the Councils and council like organizations on a state by state basis, he also 
paid attention to the character of the membership, the varying degrees of the effectiveness and success 
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He showed the “boom-in-crisis” pattern inherent in the movement, rather than a 
perfectly organized structure. However his treatment of anti-communism’s use did 
not venture beyond Bartley’s. In his account anti-communism was used 
systematically, outside the region when the council leaders allied themselves with 
other fronts of the radical right in the Cold War era, and inside, to discredit civil 
rights movement organization and intimidate white moderate tendencies. Despite 
rightly noting that “Council leaders were not of a single mind on the relationship 
between Communism and the integration crisis,” he dismissed the issue by adding 
that “the question of whether the Communists caused the problem or merely 
complicated it did not diminish their determination to deny the Negro full equality 
before the law.” 14  
Thus, both works remained uninterested in such a specific issue as anti-
communism’s place in the Massive Resistance and as Eagles noted in 2000, “in the 
three decades since the studies of Numan Bartley and Neil McMillen, however, 
historians have generally ignored whites, and particularly the powerful white 
resistance.” 15 And the treatment of the Little Rock incident as well, still occupied a 
peripheral place in the historical analysis of the Massive Resistance. McMillen 
looked at Arkansas focusing on the council activity in the state, which he regarded as 
“a disruptive force of no little consequence” and of no comparable scope to the Deep 
South, that took its strength from the bipolarization of public sentiment rather than 
                                                                                                                                     
each enjoyed in the Deep and peripheral souths, or even in different counties. In this way he reflected 
on the complexity that Bartley’s “neobourbon” argument lacked. 
14
 McMillen, The Citizens’ Council, 200. 
15
 Eagles, “Toward New Histories of the Civil Rights Era,” 842. Eagles connected this absence to the 
fact that the early accounts of the movement were written by insiders, mostly journalists, who 
mostly wrote from the perspective of the movement without considering the larger history of the 
south. In the field of political science, there was the extensive work examining southern politics, V. 
O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation, (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 
1984), though not necessarily talking about the resistance to civil rights 
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the number of its members.16 Bartley spared a chapter for the analysis of the situation 
in Little Rock which he deemed “the most decisive test of the decade”, and stated 
that the crisis resulted from “not massive resistance strategy but from an 
accumulation of failures by well-meaning leaders in Little Rock.” 17 In line with his 
argument about neobourbons, he focused on the leadership concluding that “three 
governments – local, state, and, federal – failed to avert a debacle that reasonable 
planning and a modicum of responsible leadership could have halted at any of the 
several stages in its development.”18 His account of the incident revealed a “growing 
talent for demagoguery” on Faubus’ part, who happened to find himself defending 
segregation and defying the Court, and then held on to that upon realizing the 
popularity he enjoyed. Thus what was happening behind the scenes, how the 
leadership interacted with the grassroots and eventually the exact impact of anti-
communism was not examined.  
Meanwhile, the civil rights movement scholarship on race relations greatly 
improved so as to pay attention to such specifics as the Cold War atmosphere that 
coincided the movement.19  And in the absence of such focused studies into the 
segregationist side, Little Rock found its place more in this civil rights scholarship. 
However without taking into consideration the segregationist side and the limitations 
caused by anti-communism’s use on the local level, they tended to reach an 
                                               
16
 McMillen, 96-97.  
17
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overstated conclusion that the Cold War helped the civil rights movement by merely 
urging an unwilling federal government to act. The most prominent of these was 
Mary L. Dudziak, with her recent book entitled Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the 
Image of American Democracy.20  In her account, the Massive Resistance in the 
South was dealt with only superficially, as a factor that “threatened to undermine the 
narrative of race and democracy carefully told in U.S. [Cold War] propaganda.”21 
She devoted a chapter to the Little Rock incident as the event carrying the already 
existing white dissent to a massive scale.22 However, she paid insufficient attention 
to the internal dynamics of the resistance, preferring to place the opposition more 
into its international context, rather than the local, as it fitted to her thesis. She talked 
about segregationists such as Senator Herman Talmage, Richard Russell and James 
O. Eastland’s use of an international rhetoric in their claims about the suppression of 
states’ rights by the central government. 23  This did little to intimidate the 
administration to stop asserting executive authority, and indeed, it was aimed more to 
garner segregationist support. Neglecting the segregationist opposition, she ended up 
paying too little attention to the possibility that Eisenhower was also acting to 
maintain domestic order, reassert the Constitution or his presidential authority, 
against the segregationist resistance. Specifically for Arkansas and anti-communism, 
she noted that “the state of Arkansas had its own suspicions of Communist 
                                               
20
 She was a Professor of Law and History, and was the first scholar to make the connection between 
the Cold War and the civil rights movement a main concern in 1988, with her article “Desegregation 
as a Cold War Imperative” reprinted in Michael L. Krenn, ed. Race and U.S. Foreign Policy During 
the Cold War (New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1998) In many of the later similar 
articles she wrote, she talked about the international appeals of the civil rights activists and analyzed 
the impact of the Cold War on the movement. In Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and 
the Image of American Democracy. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), she emphasized the 
pressure of Cold War foreign policy concerns on the executive branch in its support of the civil rights 
struggle, and segregationist resistance in Little Rock only found a limited place in this broad 
argument. See Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights, 13-15. 
21
 Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights, 16. 
22
 Ibid., 116-18. The events before Little Rock that she referred to as evidencing the already existing 
white dissent were Emmet Till’s murder in 1955, Montgomery Bus Boycott of 1955-56, and 
Autherine Lucy’s attempt to enroll in The University of Alabama in 1956. 
23
 Ibid., 136. 
  13
influence,” and talked about how anti-communism was embraced by such an 
influential segregationist figure as State Attorney General Bruce Bennett.24 However 
she downplayed this impediment on racial reform, and then selectively emphasized a 
red baiting incident against Faubus, as an indication of anti-communism’s effect in 
the opposite direction – to prove that Faubus’ actions helped Soviet propaganda. 25 
Thus in her very general argument, she concluded that international pressures of the 
Cold War helped the civil rights movement by making it a must for the executive 
branch (especially Eisenhower’s) to support it – ignoring the local and domestic 
reasons as a source for federal policy’s conflict with that of resisting southern states 
and ignoring the negative impact of southern anti-communism on civil rights 
organization.26 
In 2001, Thomas Borstelmann’s The Cold War and the Color Line: American 
Race Relations in the Global Era was a major work in white resistance scholarship, 
comparable to Dudziak’s.27 His book slightly reversed Dudziak’s argument, saying 
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that American race relations also affected the Cold War.28 He also noted, specifically 
about the white resistance in mid 1950s, that the anti-communist language that 
conservatives and segregationists employed, was as equally effective as the Cold 
War language of liberals and racial egalitarians, and that the Eisenhower 
administration agreed with elements of both arguments, “recogniz[ing] the logic of 
not driving African states toward the Soviet bloc for assistance, but shar[ing] an 
underlying assumption about the potential subversiveness of alienated African 
Americans.”29 Besides, he noted that no one in the administration disagreed with “the 
nation’s chief policeman, [J. Edgar Hoover, who] argued that the civil rights 
movement in the South, being angry and reformist, was thoroughly penetrated by 
Communist Party operatives.”30 He then went on however with the ways in which 
the administration interacted with Africa and the Third World, seeing the demise of 
white supremacy in the rest of the world. Thus the segregationist resistance in the 
American South and the domestic incident of Little Rock remained as side issues in 
his account.  
Another book published the following year by Joseph A. Fry, Dixie Looks 
Abroad, finally revived an interest in the American South by presenting a broad 
historical account of the important influence that the white conservative southerners 
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had on U.S. foreign policy, including the Cold War era.31 In southerners’ foreign 
policy stance, internationalism had been embraced at some point with Woodrow 
Wilson’s presidency, however, conceptions such as the inferiority of the non-white 
people, the futility of trying to help them or trying to cooperate with them remained 
constant. Another constant attached to race that Fry emphasized was the anti-radical 
and anti-communist tradition, which actually existed long before the rise of domestic 
anti-communism during the mid-1950s. The impact of the Cold War on such 
southern perceptions was strengthening them further. When confronted with the new 
threat of communism early in the Cold War, one defensive reaction in the region was 
to favor unilateral action abroad (over the long supported Wilsonian 
internationalism) and to cling to anti-communism more than ever at home. 32 
Showing the continuity of the Southern anti-communist tradition as stretching 
beyond the Cold War, Fry also stressed the importance of this aspect in the negative 
reaction of many southerners to internationalism abroad and to racial reform at home.  
Adding to Fry’s account, two key studies emerged in year 2004, in terms of 
elaborating on the specifics of southern segregationist thought and anti-communism. 
The first was Jeff Woods’ focused study on the rise of southern regional solidarity 
coinciding the Cold War era and the simultaneous rise of a southern red scare.33 
Like Fry, Woods too pointed to the continuity in southern views, stating that both 
segregation and anti-communism had been important components of the south’s 
regional identity, and the rise of the national red scare gave the segregationist 
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resistance an effective tool to assert this solidarity. He said that “the southern red 
scare was in many ways a byproduct of the region’s massive resistance to 
integration” and it was directed through “an interlocking network of local, state, and 
federal institutions.”34  Tying the regional red scare to the national one, Woods 
specifically noted the southern domination of national political bodies such as the 
House Un-American Activities Committee and Senate Internal Security 
Subcommitee, and the cooperation of the Federal Bureau of Investigation with 
similar state and local bodies (“little HUACs” and “little FBIs”, as he named them) 
in tracing the subversives in the south – who mostly happened to be integrationists 
or black civil rights activists. While talking about the Little Rock integration crisis, 
he stated that the crisis “and the Soviet Union’s launching of Sputnik had created a 
nexus within which the southerners could claim that the twin evils of Communism 
and integration were on the rise.”35 He also gave a detailed account on the efforts of 
the Attorney General Bruce Bennett to use the Education Committee of the 
Arkansas Legislative Council in exposing a Communist conspiracy behind the racial 
unrest in the state, through televised hearings. 36  Moreover he mentioned how 
Faubus signed into law, in a special session of the Legislative Council, two anti-
subversive acts a day before he closed the Little Rock schools – Act 10 required 
state employees to list their organizational affiliations and Act 115 outlawed public 
employment of NAACP members.37 Although Woods’ study resembled Bartley’s 
and McMillen’s in that it saw the movement as a monolith and mostly elite driven, 
perhaps mostly due to the wide scope of the book, his study was the first of such a 
professional and scholarly attempt in looking at the Massive Resistance, the internal 
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dynamics of the South and issues related to Cold War atmosphere, within the 
framework of a complex web of relations. 
The latest work that complemented Woods’ account, by revealing the 
varieties and complexities in which the mechanism of southern anti-communism 
worked, or at times did not work, was published the same year by George Lewis.38 
His book, The White South and the Red Menace, was a detailed study on the various 
aspects of anti-communism in segregationist thought and practice. Reminding of 
continuities as Woods did, Lewis firstly showed that the antagonisms between the 
civil rights advocates or the federal government and the South, had a broader 
historical context, not necessarily an issue specific to the so-called Civil Rights era 
or the Cold War era. He frequently noted that southern leaders of the resistance used 
anti-communism to tone down an outright racist rhetoric. Moreover, just as anti-
communism enabled an easier reach for the national audience, locally it proved an 
effective complement to such arguments as states’ rights, fears of miscegenation and 
amalgamation of the races.39  In attempting to analyze the exact impact of anti-
communism on the Massive Resistance, he also paid attention to complicating 
factors, by dividing the resistance movement into two strands as the anti-communist 
side and the side focusing more on constitutional doctrines such as states’ rights. His 
work complemented previous works by challenging the notion that the Massive 
Resistance movement was an elite driven, well organized, and monolithic formation. 
The basic strength of his work was revealing a “symbiotic relationship between 
leaders and the led, elite and populist, politician and constituent voter that lay at the 
heart of the Massive Resistance.”40  Lewis also pointed to various examples of 
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moderacy and dissent in the region, in terms of the employment of anti-communism 
as a segregationist weapon. He contended that anti-communism proved flexible 
enough a weapon both on the local and national context to counter moderacy on 
racial progress. However, he also reminded of the importance of looking at specific 
events and even individual differences, as he did by specifically focusing on North 
Carolina and Virginia in his last chapter. Thus he brought much greater 
understanding to the movement and its utilization of domestic anti-communism, 
more than any other scholar so far. Although his work was specifically concerned 
with the issue of anti-communism’s utilization by the resistance movement, the 
broader context he provided – revealing the variety of mindsets and methods, the 
various social and political forces lying beneath resistance politics – both challenged 
the oversimplified notion of the Massive Resistance movement as a monolith, and 
the oversimplified notion that treats the Cold War as an highly exceptional era.41 
However, in his account Little Rock occupied a similar place it occupied in Woods’ 
study, as an incident that segregationists used in their arguments about the 
Communist conspiracy involved in the Federal governments actions, and from 
which “by 1961, their focus had shifted to another set piece in the battle to 
desegregate the South, Freedom Rides.”42 
Thus, this thesis will be an attempt to assemble the information on the 
Massive Resistance and southern anti-communism found in the secondary sources, 
mostly produced beginning with the twenty-first century, to address the neglect of 
the segregationist opposition in the historiography of the civil rights movement. And 
in the light of the most recent historiography of the opposition, it will try to measure 
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the implications of southern anti-communism in the Little Rock integration crisis in 
Arkansas. This event was not sufficiently looked into in its local context, integrating 
the issue of anti-communism as well, despite its being a key incident in the 
culmination of both the Massive Resistance and the Cold War. Apart from the 
historical accounts mentioned above, other secondary and primary sources will be 
utilized specifically for the analysis of the Arkansas case. The most comprehensive 
guide in this light will be Elizabeth Jacoway’s 2007 publication, Turn Away Thy 
Son, which was the most recent product of an extensive historical research into the 
background of local politics surrounding the Little Rock crisis.43 She talked about 
many previously unnoticed figures such as the Arkansas Gazette editor Harry 
Ashmore, or the conciliatory representative Brook Hays, and many others, also at 
times exploring such issues of anti-communism, FBI investigations, and the impact 
of other Massive Resistance leaders or the Arkansas Citizens Council during the 
crisis. Another secondary source will be the biography of Faubus written by Roy 
Reed, who had been a reporter for the Arkansas Gazette in late 1950s.44 Another 
account by the native Little Rock journalist John F. Wells, Time Bomb: The Faubus 
Revolt, was personally published first in 1962. It was primarily a presentation of the 
journalist’s findings on various controversies surrounding the crisis and Faubus’ 
reaction, including the Commonwealth controversy. 45  His account also included 
various excerpts from press and primary documents. Also the work of Beth Roy, in 
which she commented on various interviews with local people, will be consulted.46 
The first set of primary sources that will be utilized in this thesis are the two 
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autobiographies by Orval Faubus, another two by Brooks Hays, and one by Harry 
Ashmore. In the two volumes of Down from the Hills, Faubus mostly attempted to 
explain and justify his political actions after about two decades following the 
crisis.47 Although all autobiographies will present the first person accounts, and the 
secondary sources mentioned above might tend to lose objectivity as insiders, all 
will be valuable in terms of getting at the very local circumstances.  
The archival sources that will be incorporated into the study are from various 
collections held in some Southern libraries. Among the Orval Faubus papers held at 
the University of Arkansas at Fayetteville, mostly personal correspondences, records 
pertaining to the Little Rock crisis and to race relations in Arkansas will be utilized. 
Held in the same library, The Citizens’ Council of America Literature will provide 
an insight into the segregationist and anti-communist propaganda that reached 
Arkansas, through various booklets and pamphlets.48 The other collections that are 
utilized in the general analysis of the Massive Resistance movement and anti-
communism are the James O. Eastland Collection held in the University of 
Mississippi, and the William D. McCain Pamphlet Collection held in the University 
of Southern Mississippi.49 In the utilization of all these sources, special attention 
will be placed in trying to analyze the coming together of anti-communism and a 
segregationist stance on the grassroots level and its role in local politics. 
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The following section, Chapter 2, will present a general overview of the 
segregationist and anti-communist thought in the whole region, focusing mostly on 
the Deep South, with the two states Mississippi and Georgia, as the account goes into 
the Massive Resistance era. It will begin with a small introduction into the kind of 
anti-communism that was employed in the South, as part of a conservative tradition, 
revealing how race was central to such conservatism, and how anti-communism 
could include various regional concerns other than Communism itself. It will then 
account for the harm done to liberalism in the region, with the coming of Cold War 
beginning in early 1950s, by the conservative consensus that also used anti-
communism as an effective tool. Going on with the rise of the Massive Resistance 
movement, it will evaluate the kind of anti-communism employed during the 
movement, with such issues as its comparison to McCarthyism, or the ways in which 
it operated – the interplay between the leaders and the grassroots, the continuity and 
the longstanding locality of anti-communism, and the toning down of the racist 
rhetoric by an emphasis on anti-communism during this era. Meanwhile the state of 
Georgia will be looked into, as one example of the mutual existence of anti-
communism and segregationist outlook in the region before the peak of the resistance 
in mid 1950s. It will exemplify how anti-communism had from the start been part of 
the peculiar Southern antipathy to, and fear of, any kind of radicalism that might go 
against the rigid racial order of white supremacy in southern society. The coming of 
the Cold War enhanced these fears, forged the regional solidarity further, and anti-
communism gained an increasing importance in the defense of this solidarity. Also 
Mississippi will be a focus, further projecting the local level, detailed by introducing 
important figures in the movement and their anti-communist rhetoric and introducing 
the Citizens’ Councils. Chapter 3, will be an examination of Arkansas and 
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specifically the conditions preceding the crisis in Little Rock, in terms of the 
combination of segregationist resistance and anti-communism, followed by a 
concluding chapter about the exploration of the theme in Arkansas and further 
elaboration on the importance of understanding the local for a better historical 
conception of broader issues such as the Civil Rights Movement, the Cold War, or 
even American Politics in general.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
 THE SOUTHERN CONTEXT 
 
 
2.1 The Conservative Base in the South 
While trying to understand the South and its resistance to civil rights progress 
during the high tide of the Cold War, one must look beyond the Cold War era and 
focus more on continuities. This way it would be possible to be on a safer ground in 
terms of coming to an understanding of the local and the federal policies, their own 
domestic motivations, and even the interplay of all this in determining national 
policy. This aspect gains specific importance when the use of anti-communism by 
defenders of white supremacy during the movement is to be understood. The kind of 
anti-communism employed by the massive resisters, which brings together various 
other concerns (the preservation of the existing racial order being the most 
prominent), had a much longer history than the anti-communism of the Cold War on 
the national level.  
The way the relationship between the Massive Resistance movement in the 
South and anti-communism is examined in this thesis, mostly confirms the “the 
paranoid style” in American politics that Richard Hofstadter had detected, in its 
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specific focus on rhetoric and social atmosphere.50 In terms of the southern brand of 
anti-communism that will be looked at, Joel Kovel’s definition of the kind of anti-
communism that he tried to reflect in his Red Hunting in the Promised Land, fits best 
into this thesis. In the introduction to his work he said:  
…the notion of anticommunism is entirely associated with the recently 
concluded struggle with the Soviet Union and its affiliates in Communist 
movements around the World. I would hold, however, that this is a one-
dimensional way of looking at things, which sees the lesser dimension at 
that, and sheds little light on the extraordinary power this ideology holds 
over our national life. For anticommunism is not primarily, in my view, 
about Communism at all. It is, rather, a way of being American that 
proceeds from a deep historical wound.51  
  
No matter how overstated the argument may be, when the kind of anti-communism 
employed in the South and its use against the perceived threat to the pattern of racial 
relations in the region is to be considered, such an emphasis in both the historical 
continuities and the flexibility of the meanings that anti-communism came to 
include, gains specific importance. Similarly, M. J. Heale, in his account of the 
history of what he called “the anticommunist tradition” traced the origins of this kind 
of anti-communism that resurfaced during the Massive Resistance era, as far back as 
the middle of the nineteenth century. Heale established a link between the fragilities 
of the republican form of government, and the readiness of Americans to hunt 
subversives. Even the Civil War involved “northern perceptions that the South 
represented the very negation of republican liberty, a mighty cancer in a republic of 
freemen, and…southern perceptions that northerners were bent on reducing the 
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South to colonial dependency.”52 In such fragility, the preservation of the republic 
depended on the “active vigilance” of its citizens, and the voluntary associations such 
as the temperance and antislavery, along with the vigilante groups appearing before 
the Civil War, supplemented the political parties, in “creating a tradition of energetic 
citizenship.”53 And the nineteenth century America, this duty was most effectively 
performed by those Americans of Anglo-Saxon heritage, white people with property 
who were mostly small farmers, businessmen and southern planters.54 The rising 
antagonism between the North and the South, increasing racial fears also left a strong 
anti radical legacy among white southerners, which would loom into the following 
decades, to resurface in the late 1940s in the form of real counter subversive, anti-
communist measures, when the South would rise once again in defense of its racial 
ways, with the Dixiecrat movement.  
This fear of inside agitators, a strong attachment to republican tradition, and 
readiness to brand the racially inferior as un-American, continued most strongly in 
the post-Civil War South. “It was the South that most anxiously attempted to 
reconcile American republican doctrine with racial privilege” and southerners’ 
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earliest encounter with socialism made communism one of the forms in which their 
extra fragile social order, with slavery and a crowded dangerous population at the 
center, was threatened.55 The South, which “characteristically combined a suspicion 
of outside influences with a veneration for local traditions”, did this with the 
inheritance of a common “sectional identity” shaped by the memories of slavery, 
and the traumas of the Civil War and Reconstruction. In terms of the implication of 
this kind of regional solitary, with the “Black Belt” at its core, Heale noted that, 
the parochial elites of the South, intent on the preservation of racial and 
economic privilege, presided over a traditionalist political culture in 
which radicalism seemed indistinguishable from subversion. From the 
Russian Revolution onward every labor organizer or civil libertarian in 
the Deep South risked being labeled a red, an alien ‘other’ to whom the 
normal constitutional protections need not apply.56  
 
The Bolshevik victory in Russia and the following national red scare also had an 
important racial context to it, adding to southern conceptions about the 
subversiveness of blacks. The massive labor unrest in northern urban centers 
immediately after World War I, was accompanied by violent racial clashes. That 
year’s race riots in Washington D.C. and Chicago, and the comments in the northern 
press about a red and black alliance also confirmed southern fears. Indeed after some 
clashes in the south the same year, mostly related to an increased awareness brought 
by the black war experience and the white reaction to it, such an alliance became a 
regional concern.57 This perception continued into the following decades. However, 
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as Heale noted, it was not until the late 1940s that a “full-scale anticommunist 
crusade” was initiated in the region. Heale explained this absence with the existence 
of a one-party system in the region till that time and the disfranchisement of almost 
all African Americans.58 And it was in early 1950s that systemized anti-communist 
programs began to be seen in the Deep South. Apart from an exclusively Cold War 
anti-communist outlook, Heale, like Key, looked into the southern response to 
change and progress to explain this surfacing of red scare politics.  
As noted earlier, it was with the Dixiecrat movement that this response most 
clearly culminated. V.O. Key, Jr. noted in his lengthy volume on southern politics, 
Southern Politics in State and Nation that, the most intense support for the southern 
revolt came from the areas with the greatest black population. 59 As with the Massive 
Resistance case in the following decade, in which the South united in reaction to a 
perceived threat to its own peculiar ways, the Deep South was again at the center. 
And this center was stirred from time to time in the nation’s history. For the southern 
revolt of 1948 Key mentioned the incoming of “a new ingredient”, by which he 
meant “a closer alliance of the black-belt counties with industry”, that had been 
added since 1928. An important part of the Dixiecrat campaign was its anti-New 
Deal aspect and even in the Deep South “the will to bolt the national party was by no 
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means universal.”60 Along with race, the anti-New Deal business conservatives were 
important in overcoming this and among the southern states that remained loyal to 
national Democrat ticket, in Arkansas for example, the center of agitation was the 
plantation counties of eastern Arkansas where the Arkansas Free Enterprise 
Association was headquartered – the association was comprised of big planters and 
industrialists and “was prominent in all the Dixiecrat maneuvers.”61  
While Key noted the beginnings of such trend in 1928, M. J. Heale noted that 
it was around the same time that evidences of the red and black alliance began to 
emerge. After 1928 the Communist Party’s support of the cause of blacks “reinforced 
the anti-communism of the white supremacists.”62  Also in 1928 in Birmingham, 
Alabama, “the mostly black Share Croppers’ Union openly accepted the calls of the 
Moscow Congress of the Communist International for ‘self-determination of the 
black belt’ in the United States” and in 1931 violent clashes would occur between 
union members and local protesters. 63  Such episodes further encouraged the 
increasing alliance between business conservatives and the defenders of the racial 
status quo.64 Although the international Cold War atmosphere was one pretext to a 
systematized assault on anti-communism both in the South and in the nation, the 
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historical accumulation of the idea at local and domestic contexts was another 
important component.  
The culmination of simultaneous anti-communist and white supremacist 
sentiment was also within the context of a general rightward trend in the nation. 
Indeed, the South was an important element in this conservative swing. Thomas 
Borstelmann noted the “apex of Southern influence in Congress”, all throughout the 
late 1940s and early 1950s. It was a time when Democrats of the Dixie revolution 
had gained an important influence as chairs of the most powerful committees of both 
the Senate and the House of Representatives, as a result of seniority rules and the 
one-party character of Southern politics.65 This Dixiecrat influence, along with a 
rising regional solidarity in the South, formed the basis of the Massive Resistance 
that emerged in the next decade. And, anti-communism, which had long been an 
important component of the ideological basis to this solidarity, would gain increasing 
importance in the following decade in terms of its place in the resistance to civil 
rights.  
Charles Wallace Collins’ Whither Solid South published in 1947, which 
Bartley called “the Bible of the Dixiecrats”, showed both the rising sense of regional 
solidarity in the South and how anti-communism was an important component on the 
eve of the Dixiecrat revolt.66 Bartley’s analysis of Collins’ viewpoint was a key 
explanation to the simultaneous rise of the southern resistance against the centralism 
of the federal government, communism and any attempt at racial reform in the 
following decade: 
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In Collins’ judgment, influential admirers of the Soviet System, self-
seeking federal bureaucrats, cynical politicians, African Americans, the 
CIO, and northern church groups misled by “oversimplified slogans” had 
turned their crusade for black equality and state capitalism to the South, 
which was the most important bastion of conservative opposition to their 
plans. Collins outlined strategies of resistance and expressed confidence 
that the southern people would never permit racial amalgamation or 
police-state capitalism.67  
 
After noting on the same document, Jeff Woods also pointed out that although “the 
Dixiecrats’ appeals to segregationists and anti-Communists never made the electoral 
impact” they desired, they still “made significant showings in the plantation counties 
of Alabama, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Louisiana.” These areas, he rightly 
noted, would become during the following two decades, “the established centers of 
the southern red scare.”68  
Besides, anti-communism had from the start a great role to play in the failure 
of the post-war southern liberalism in surviving into the following decade, which 
turned out to be the high tide of the Massive Resistance movement. 69 Before the 
anti-communist sentiment reached its zenith, there was a rising tide of liberalism 
that did find some appeal among southerners, as part of the progressive sentiment in 
the post-war period. Tony Badger noted that liberal politicians were elected to state 
legislatures, state houses, and Congress and they represented an alliance of lower 
income whites, blacks, veterans, women, and labor. However, they mostly had their 
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faith in the economic progress that New Deal like policies would bring, and thus 
they mostly adopted a gradualist position on issues of race.70 Another challenge to 
segregation could have been the modernizing impact of post war urbanization and 
industrialization, bringing such improvements as better education or a higher per 
capita income, however, as Bartley noted, “the South remained more rural in 
outlook than economic and demographic reality justified…[and] clinging to part 
ideas of Dixie customs and traditions, southern whites had changed their racial 
attitudes and practices very little in terms of day-to-day relationships.”71  
The economic liberalism present in the south, let alone racial liberalism, 
failed in the face of the peculiarly southern brand of conservatism and anti-
communism. The two curtailed attempts at racial and economic reform best 
illustrated this failure. The Southern Conference on Human Welfare had been 
established in 1938 as a response to Roosevelt administration’s “Report on 
Economic Conditions of the South,” by middle-class white New Dealers and pre-war 
liberals and leftists. Burdened also by internal mismanagement, the SCHW had to 
disband in 1948.72 Another failure was the failure of the Operation Dixie, which was 
a 1946 project of the Congress of Industrial Organization aiming to unionize 
traditional southern industries in collaboration with the SCHW, and which openly 
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appealed to blacks. Conservative business leaders and politicians in the South again 
opposed the movement with charges of communism and racial disruption, allying 
with local chambers of commerce, and even local law enforcement agencies. As 
Bartley noted, anti-union publications declared that the CIO aimed to “arouse class-
hatred and race-hatred for the purpose of creating strikes, riots, bloodshed, anarchy, 
and revolution.”73  The group had already begun to be dominated by right-wing 
leaders during the rise of the anti-communist sentiment of the Truman 
administration, and by 1949 all left-wing elements, the SCHW included, was purged 
from the union and meetings began to be held on a segregated basis.74  
Indeed, the white South held a position as one of the factors that undermined 
the progressive aspects of the post war industrial boom, throughout the nation.75 
Anti-communism in the south, compared to the one at the national level, showed 
much deeper continuities and understanding of this southern background is also 
important for explaining the rapid rise of national anti-communism during the 
1940s. 76  Furthermore, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and The House Un-
American Activities Committee increasingly began to target biracial organizations. 
The FBI declared interracial association among subversion criteria making “left-
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wing unions and other popular-front groups prime suspects.” And the HUAC 
released the report in 1947 that declared the SCHW “perhaps the most deviously 
camouflaged Communist-front organization in the nation.”77  
As the economic liberalism collapsed, both in the nation and in the south, any 
remaining ideas of reform were in the field of race relations. The National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, as Bartley pointed out, was “at 
the forefront of national liberalism, and during the 1950s no other reform group had 
an equal impact on developments in the South,” owing its survival mostly to the 
purge of leftist elements in its body and to its being a middle-class establishment in 
alliance with “white liberals and labor bureaucrats.” 78 Moreover, liberals began to 
see the improvement in business as the key to progress in the south, and racial issues, 
especially segregation, came to be a moral, rather than an economic, problem that 
would gradually be solved. The rising Cold War concerns reinforced this moral 
aspect and it was also reflected in the administration’s piece meal actions. 79 
However, despite these limited actions, the conservative anti-communist coalition 
with the South at the center would not permit radical challenges to its racial order.  
This coalition discarded liberalism and gave way to a stance of “moderacy,” 
which was almost synonymous with inactivity. It was on this domestic background 
of simultaneous rise of black activism and crushing of liberalism that anti-communist 
measures rose in the South to counter attempts at racial integration, accompanying 
the national red scare. Moreover, the South had always been a staunchly anti-
communist region and the reason why it was not recognized was that no systematical 
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and outstandingly recognizable red scare programs were launched. However, anti-
communism had always been a very important part of the southern regional 
solidarity that rose at times of certain crisis; mostly inseparable from other themes in 
this solidarity such as state’s rights or racial order. Thus, the South always had this 
conservative, white supremacist and anti-communist base, upon which it developed 
whatever required strategies when it felt insecure, and the rise of the Massive 
Resistance in 1950s was one example.  
The tension brought by international circumstances of the Cold War further 
contributed to the continuation of southern conservatism and resistance to civil 
rights. Indeed, far from being a condition specific to the Cold War, racial 
assumptions had extensively shaped the way white southerners “consistently viewed 
the world through a distinctly southern lens.”80 The impact of the Cold War on this 
southern perception was strengthening it further. As Fry pointed out, the dramatic 
changes in the South’s economy, society and politics after World War II already 
“heightened southern insecurities and strengthened the region’s preexisting foreign 
policy proclivities.” The decline of agriculture, growth of industrial and service 
sectors, and urbanization, were simultaneous with the increasing restiveness of the 
southern black population, growing presidential inclination to support racial reform, 
the activist federal courts, and the national and international focus on the issue of 
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race. When confronted with the new threat of communism early in the Cold War, 
clinging to anti-communism was one defensive reaction in the region.81  
 
2.2. Anti-communism in the South during the Massive Resistance 
When the Dixiecrat campaign failed outside the Deep South and Truman was 
elected in 1948, a brief period signaled positive developments in terms of southern 
liberalism’s rise. However this lasted till 1950 and the conservative setback in 
politics went on to prepare the groundwork for the gradual rise of the Massive 
Resistance movement in the new decade. After Truman’s victory the Democratic 
Party moved on to remove Dixiecrat members from the Deep South states and liberal 
political victories were won in the upper South. However, as Bartley noted, the 
movement “represented a substantial regional dissent from national trends. It was in 
a real sense a premature expression of massive resistance.”82 Moreover the liberal 
political gains, mostly in the upper South, would give way to conservative victories 
in 1950.  
The federal judiciary’s increasing focus on racial injustice would touch 
seriously on segregation in higher education in 1950, and this was one factor that 
raised a racial reaction and revived the Dixiecrat spirit in the region.83 In 1950, three 
important cases were decided, the most important of which was Sweatt v. Painter. 
Herman Sweatt applied to the University of Texas Law School and was denied 
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admission, again because of his race and Texas opted for creating a separate law 
school for blacks. This time Sweatt’s lawyers attacked the practice of segregation, 
claiming that “Sweatt’s constitutional right of equal protection of the laws could be 
satisfied only by admission to the state university.” The Court determined that the 
separate law school was never close to being equal to the white one, and ordered the 
admission of Sweatt to the white law school. Thus in Sweatt v. Painter, the court 
came very close to destroying the “separate but equal” doctrine.84 
Besides, during 1949 and 1950, southerners gave a “bitter congressional 
wrangle” in Washington over the Fair Employment Practices Commission 
legislation, which weakly passed in the House but was filibustered in the Senate. The 
final component to this backdrop was the “mounting crescendo of hysteria” brought 
about by the investigations led by McCarthy.85 The following statement by Bartley 
briefly explained this background to the Massive Resistance: 
The federal courts were laying the legal groundwork for destruction of 
the southern social system, and the FEPC provided the direct link 
between social separation and property rights. The whole integrationist 
campaign against segregation, states’ rights, and private property 
emerged hand-in-hand with “Communist subversion” in government. A 
vague uneasiness was soon apparent in the behavior of many southern 
voters, a fact that was soon to make itself felt in politics.86  
 
1950 also became the year in which many liberal candidates lost primary elections 
against more conservative ones, who “interspersed generous portions of racist 
oratory with attacks on their opponents’ alleged softness towards Trumanism, 
communism, and labor bossism,” and thus appealing both to the white rural vote 
with their stance in racial issues and to the urban business conservatives with their 
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stance in issues of communism and “Trumanism.”87 In 1949, a series of HUAC 
hearings entitled “Hearings Regarding Communist Infiltration of Minority Groups” 
had further enhanced the anti-communist arguments of racial conservatives. The 
proceedings would end, just as Senator Joseph McCarthy’s hunt of Communists in 
government and military ranks began, and contributed greatly to the victory of the 
Republican Dwight D. Eisenhower in the 1952 presidential election.88 The two Cold 
War crises during the Truman administration’s second term, the beginning of the 
Korean War abroad and the rise of McCarthyism at home, had turned attention away 
from social reform and divisive issues such as racial reform.89  With a southern 
conservative base and a deadlock in Congress during most of the decade, the 
executive branch remained generally inactive on racial issues and did little more 
than continue Truman administration’s policies.90 
While Eisenhower took no position on segregation, the focus of federal 
judiciary on segregated education went on and cases began to culminate in the 
Brown v. Board of Education decision, and voices of dissent would begin to rise, 
even before the first decision in May 1954. The decision that came on a “Black 
Monday,” as segregationists labeled it concluded that segregated education facilities 
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were inherently unequal and thus in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. In 
August, 1954, in response to the first Supreme Court decision, Virginia governor 
Thomas B. Stanley had appointed a commission on public education headed by 
Senator Garland Gray, which presented in 1955 a gradual and moderate program of 
accepting token desegregation and leaving the implementation to local authorities. 
However even before a constitutional convention met, Senator Harry Flood Byrd 
had successfully advertised the passage of an interposition resolution by the 
legislature, [he had] issued a call for ‘massive resistance’ to desegregation, and an 
all-out defense of white supremacy had become the dominant theme of Virginia 
politics.” 91 The Brown decision overtly confirmed Byrd’s disappointment with the 
administration’s unwillingness to “turn the federal executive power to the support of 
white southern concepts of racial justice,” and as he saw it, “the very Court assigned 
guardianship of the federal Constitution had overturned precedent and assaulted 
cherished traditions by basing its decision not on the words of the Constitution itself, 
but on the writings of a group of social scientists that included Negroes, a European 
– probably leftists all.”92 
In early February 1956, Virginia general assembly approved of a bill 
consisting of various segregationist measures, including an interpositionist one 
leaving the control of any school targeted by the Court to the direct responsibility of 
the State. Stanley announced his support of interposition and the Gray Commission 
discarded its gradualist local provisions, bringing them into alignment with the 
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governor’s position.93 Then this doctrine soon spread to legislatures of other states; 
and as Massive Resistance gained prominence, the southern congressional 
delegation announced in March 1956, a “Declaration of Constitutional Principles”. 
Known as the Southern Manifesto, the declaration was signed by 19 of the southern 
states’ 22 senators and 82 of its 106 representatives. It embraced interposition 
declaring the Brown decision unconstitutional.94 This reaction depended heavily on 
constitutional arguments and favored states’ rights against the centralized power of 
the federal government.  
The movement materialized especially after the second Brown decision on 
May 31, 1955, that brought a gradualist approach to the implementation of the 1954 
decision. The ruling had assigned responsibility for desegregation plans to local 
school boards and the vagueness about the implementation of the decision in the long 
term “appeared to strengthen the position of the southern moderates and further to 
sunder regional unity.”95 The gradualist and vague nature of this implementation 
decree, was mostly in line with the southern demands. The two most important issues 
that pressured the Court were; first, the impossibility of the Court’s “ventur[ing] 
beyond the executive department’s position”, and second, the inability to “do little 
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more than establish the basis for realistic adjustments in race relations.” And 
similarly, the crystallization of the resistance benefited not only from the one-year 
time interval between the two decisions, but also from the “dearth of leadership in 
the political branches of the national government”, especially during that time.96 
Actually, the resistance was not exclusively a direct sudden reaction to the 
Brown decision and it already had what Bartley called the “neobourbon” base, which 
“represented southern reaction and aimed at imposing a fixed agrarian social and 
ideological structure upon an urban-industrial south” and which imposed itself 
during hard times. Hard times were signaled in the South by “rural-urban cleavages, 
the threat of desegregation, and the continuing urban cultural invasion of the 
countryside.” 97  These forces had, by 1950, heightened southern insecurities and 
revived the Dixiecrat spirit that seemed to back down by then, and by the time the 
Supreme Court cases were handed, the south had already coalesced, ready for the 
outright expression of its resistance through legal means after the 1955 decision.  
Far from being a purely legislative strategy at the political level, the 
movement was knit around rigid racial assumptions, as it went also hand in hand 
with the white elite and the grassroots. As Lewis noted, the leaders of the movement 
were not willing to take radical stances in the segregation issue without checking the 
public sentiment. The series of public referenda held in the wake of Brown were the 
clearest guide for the movement elites. Moreover, state legislators all over the South 
sought their white constituencies’ approval before taking a stand on segregation. As 
Lewis pointed out, “one of the reasons that Massive Resistance had taken hold by 
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mid-1956 is that, on every occasion upon which the white South’s political 
constituencies were asked to vote on a measure of legislative resistance, they 
approved it, and did so by substantial margins.”98 The crystallization of the resistance 
also depended on the existence of an already a receptive public.  
Moreover, the Massive Resistance movement employed various tools other 
than legislation and involved various other arguments and ideas in the defense and 
implementation of the constitutional doctrine of interposition and states’ rights. The 
increasing use of an anti-communist rhetoric, in the height of the Cold War, was one 
of these. Indeed, as Lewis noted, it was “the fluid nature of resistance rhetoric and 
the broad panoply of devices that fell within the rubric of the Southern Manifesto’s 
‘all legal means’ that allowed communism to play such a central role in the armory 
of Massive Resistance.”99 As it was with the legislative aspect, anti-communism had 
the same receptive public, as the national anti-communist consensus assisted its 
development. However, anti-communism itself in the South had always been part of 
a conservative, anti-radical tradition which made its deployment even easier in the 
region.  
As Woods noted, by late 1940s and early 1950s, “the south had Communists, 
patriots, anti-communist networks, political elites, and a federal example.”100 The 
south did look to the example displayed by McCarthy on the federal level; however 
the southern red scare had an important distinction, which was the complicating 
impact of the centrality of race. As Jeff Woods points out, “the southern red scare 
was in many ways a byproduct of the region’s massive resistance to integration” and 
the intensity of the anti-communist sentiment had always been directly proportional 
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to the extent of the “national criticism of the region’s racial institutions.”101 Unlike 
the explicitly Cold War context of the national red scare, the one in the south had an 
internal and regional sanctuary as the source of origin.  
One result of this was its being much more of a complex process than 
McCarthyism in terms of its operation as a mechanism. The complexities in the 
South’s own red scare were also the direct result of the complexity of the resistance 
movement, of which it was a tool. George Lewis in general best described this 
complexity of the Massive Resistance movement:  
If the constant interchange of ideas between resistance elites and the 
grassroots suggests a mutual reliance born out of unprecedented pressure 
on the region’s established ways of life, certain political events of the 
period also suggest that neither section of segregationist society was 
willing to go forward without the express support of the other.102 
 
While McCarthyism was more directed from above, imposed on the public, 
and was thus short-lived, its southern counterpart, was the result of an interplay of 
various elements of society where the grassroots was more incorporated in its 
promotion, was more sincere in its ideology enriched with other common regional 
concerns, and thus much more long lived.103 Although southerners avoided outright 
and systemized red scare programs like McCarthy did, at least till mid-1950s and 
avoided any direct association with McCarthy personally, they welcomed most of 
his anti-communist ideas. And even after McCarthy was discarded in 1954, this 
aspect of his legacy lived on in the south, combined with the rapid resurfacing of 
regional solidarity in the resistance to Brown.  
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A more favorable example to southern anti-communists was actually J. 
Edgar Hoover of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Compared to McCarthy, he 
had much more in common with the segregationist and anti-communist South, 
which resulted both from the personal proximity of his approving of Jim Crow 
where he grew up in Washington D.C. and his being the most powerful and 
respected investigator of Communist influence among blacks. Throughout the 1930s 
and 1940s, the FBI under Hoover’s leadership, had investigated various black 
organizations such as the Civil Rights Congress, the Southern Conference for 
Human Welfare, the National Negro Congress, and the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People. An FBI report in 1953 entitled “The Communist 
Party and the Negro” confirmed southern perceptions, just as the HUAC reports 
resulting from the hearings of 1949.104  
Although the Brown decision that came one year later pressured Hoover and 
the FBI to stay away from the struggle between segregationists and civil rights 
advocates in the South, Hoover’s views were more in favor of the segregationist side 
and he quietly went on feeding both HUAC and southern state investigators with 
information. Furthermore he went on presenting Washington with a confidential 
reports during the years between 1954 and 1956, which began to include the 
NAACP in its warnings and also affected many in the Eisenhower administration’s 
cabinet, and more confidential reports went on to leak to HUAC and the Senate 
Internal Security Subcommittee – a central agency headed by the Mississippi 
Senator James O. Eastland, which was also an important platform from which 
Eastland conducted his anti-communist and segregationist propaganda. 105  The 
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southern domination of the two national political bodies during late 1940s and mid 
1950s, House Un-American Activities Committee and Senate Internal Security 
Subcommittee, were valuable experiences for the south that guided its politicians in 
their own regional red scare. The material that were mounted during the hearings of 
these committees greatly helped the southern leaders of the red scare in developing 
the anti-communist warfare that fitted very nicely into their Massive Resistance 
strategies following Brown. 
The experience of southern leaders with national anti-communism was 
mounted mostly during this period. Moreover, as noted earlier, in the wake of the 
Brown decision, both anti-communism and political regional solidarity – centered 
on concerns about the attempted reversal of the racial order – had been established 
as a much-consolidated base. What happened during the national red scare was, in a 
way, providing the South with efficient tools to address its already heightened 
insecurities about race and communism. Although the southern red scare was 
modeled after and fed from the sources of the federal example, anti-communism in 
the south was always accompanied by a disdain of federal rule and a strong ideology 
of states’ rights, along with the need to preserve the racial status quo. 
Other than the HUAC, or the FBI, the loyalty program Truman adopted in 
1947, his usage of the Smith Act of 1940 against American Communists beginning 
with 1948, the Mundt-Nixon Bill and the Internal Security Act of 1950 had been 
setting examples on how to fight communism at home; and even before the rise of 
McCarthy on the national scene, states had begun adopting similar measures. Even 
outside the south, as Heale pointed out, the Congress had always set the example for 
inquiry through investigations and legislations, however beginning with the Red 
Scare following the First World War, “policing sedition had been more a state than a 
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federal responsibility, one which the New York legislature had sought to discharge 
by dispatching a committee to investigate the Bolshevik menace.”106 And when it 
was the south in question, it was not surprising that states’ rights became an integral 
part of “policing sedition.”  
Thus, there had long been forces at stake in the South that gradually prepared 
the simultaneous rise and conjunction of anti-communism and white resistance to 
racial reform. And for both, the developments at the state level were central. It was 
also noted earlier that the southern red scare was a more complex process than its 
national counterpart, in terms of its organization and development, in that; it was 
less of an upright imposition on the public from the top. However, despite the role 
played by the grassroots and the obvious public support, leading political figures 
had from the start initiated both the Massive Resistance and its anti-communist 
agenda. The earlier mentioned one party character that made personalities an 
important political preference and this peculiar southern political trait, required 
special attention to the leading elite and their activities on the local level. In this 
regard, the most outstanding figures in leading the anti-communist resistance 
strategies in the Deep South, pre-Brown Georgia and post-Brown Mississippi, will 
be at focus. 
 
2.3 The Deep South: Georgia and Mississippi 
In Georgia, the most influential figure in terms of anti-communism and 
defense of segregation preceding Brown, was Eugene Talmadge, who served as 
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governor from 1932 to the early 1940s. As noted before, personalities had great 
importance in the one-party politics of the South and thus they might have much to 
offer in terms of an insight into understanding the region. Talmadge, “the fiercely 
anti-labor champion of the ‘wool hat boys’ and critic of Franklin Roosevelt, whose 
New Deal he denounced as communistic” happened to be the governor in 1935, 
when the state adopted its first formal anti-communist measure. He was also the 
father of Herman Talmadge who would be a McCarthy admirer and governor to the 
state during the Massive Resistance of the 1950s. The Talmadges were, in Heale’s 
words, “ ‘good ole boys’ who vigorously upheld white supremacy, fought to retain 
the county-unit system, and drew their support from rural Georgia and from some 
working class whites in the cities”, where the liberal minded people – African 
Americans and poor whites – couldn’t vote.107 
Governor Talmadge even developed presidential aspirations in 1936, when 
with the support of some right wing and northern business elements outside the 
south backed his anti-New Deal ‘Grassroots convention’ bringing together other 
defenders of white supremacy and those “oppose[ed] to Negroes, the New Deal 
and…Karl Marx.” 108  Although the convention was a failure, his presidential 
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aspirations were shattered, and it turned out that Roosevelt and his New Deal was 
still popular, this did not mean that outwardly liberal tendencies were welcome in 
the state. Indeed, the next most revealing occurrence in 1935 - the passing of a 
teacher loyalty oath bill requiring teachers “to refrain from directly or indirectly 
subscribing to or teaching any theory which is inconsistent with the fundamental 
principles of patriotism and high ideals of Americanism” - was initiated by a New 
Dealer.109  
The rise of anti-communism went on with a 1938 law barring aliens from 
public employment, along with a general nativist sentiment. 1938 was also the year 
in which local patriotism rose in the state, partly in response to Roosevelt’s attempt 
to purge a conservative Georgian off the Senate, and in which a “Georgian Creed” 
was adopted in the legislature. And when the threat to segregation came with the 
NAACP’s success at “chipping away at the ‘separate but equal’ doctrine” in the 
Missouri Gaines case, Talmadge ran a double campaign in 1940 to “keep the 
education of the races separate” and to remove “any person in the university system 
advocating communism or racial equality.” Eugene Talmadge, was elected governor 
in 1946 once again with an “anti-black and anti-red campaign.” However upon his 
death the new voice of the Talmadge faction became his son Herman Talmadge, 
who was elected governor in 1948, running against the civil rights stance of Truman 
administration and the reformist stance of Governor Melvin E. Thompson.110 
                                               
109
 Ibid. The bill was introduced by E. D. Rivers, who was the speaker around which a reform group 
coalesced in the legislature, and Richard B. Russell ran successfully for the US Senate against 
Talmadge on a pro-New Deal program. Indeed, as Heale noted, the New Deal was never a direct 
assault on race relations in the South, and a red-scare would begin to be fully initiated as a program 
when such a threat – especially one directed towards segregation – was perceived. See Heale, 
McCarthy’s Americans, 220. 
110
 Ibid., 222-32. In 1942, he lost the primary to a reformist administration, which during the wartime 
economic boom identified with urban and suburban elites and promoted economic growth. However 
Talmadge’s faction still remained an influential base, which would resurface in the mid 1940s, when 
the CIO’s Operation Dixie played again on southern fears, with its increasing support of African 
Americans. By the time Operation Dixie failed in late 1940s, Truman administration’s national civil 
  48
Intensifying Cold War circumstances added onto such concerns and 
segregationists became more vocal in their anti-communist stance. And it was 
during Herman Talmadge’s governorship till 1955, in which McCarthy-like 
strategies were fully embraced in the state and the red scare was carried to a level 
more than just election issues. In 1953, the state legislature passed The Floyd Anti-
Subversion Act, which was patterned after Maryland’s Ober Law.111  One vocal 
supporter of the bill was former HUAC chairman John S. Wood, under whose 
leadership the 1949 HUAC hearings assaulted black civil rights organizations. 
Wood assured the critics of the bill that it was not in conflict with federal agencies. 
Governor Talmadge also advertised its passage by emphasizing his commitment to 
responsible government and promising that it would not result in the harassment of 
any individual. Another supporter was the Attorney General Eugene Cook. Then by 
the end of the Korean War, security questionnaires, investigations, university purges 
came about and an un-American activities committee was on the agenda.112 The 
impending Supreme Court decision in Brown towards the end of 1953 had great role 
to play in the full-scale assault on communism.  
Indeed Georgia was among the three states that formed the core of the 
resistance, along with Mississippi and South Carolina.113 And early supporters of the 
anti-communist control laws would also be vociferous defenders of segregation. 
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During Talmadge’s time, the issue of segregation became totally associated with the 
anti-communist crusade, and Talmadge became “the first major political figure to 
take a strong segregationist position on college desegregation.”114 After the Court 
had asked for “further argument about the compatibility of segregation with the 
Constitution”, Talmadge reconvened the legislature in which a two-pronged plan 
was launched –communist-control laws were strengthened and solid measures were 
taken towards preserving segregated schooling.115  
In the 1954 gubernatorial primary elections, both Brown and anti-
communism was the campaign issue. The winner was Marvin Griffin, the candidate 
of the state Democratic Party’s Talmadge faction, who would simply campaign by 
saying that “the meddlers, demagogues, race baiters, and Communists are 
determined to destroy every vestige of states’ rights.”116 As Heale noted, Herman 
Talmadge (now seeking reelection as a US senator), Roy Harris (an influential 
political figure who was the campaign manager to both Eugene and Herman 
Talmadges), the Atlanta Congressman James C. Davis, Attorney General Eugene 
Cook, and the new governor, without the opposition of the liberal faction that was 
defused by then, would constitute “the group that put its considerable wits to the 
twin causes of resisting integration and exposing red subversion in Georgia in the 
mid-1950s.”117  
In 1955, Talmadge would publish a book entitled You and Segregation, in 
which he claimed that “for over a decade now, the American people have been 
undergoing…vicious and dangerous brainwashing” by the international 
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Communists.118 In the book, he would also defend rights of property, conciliate 
industry, noted his hostility toward CIO, which he claimed was in association with 
the NAACP. As Bartley noted, depending on the only book of his and his public 
speeches, he “was a states’ rights nationalist…and tended to confuse nationalism 
with orthodoxy and non-conformity with communism…[he] idolized a static society 
although approving economic change, and he elevated white supremacy to a 
position of paramount importance, clinging as he did to long-discredited racial 
interpretations of history.”119 During the Massive Resistance era, the book would be 
a key text for the rest of the South, which increasingly cooperated in the cause to 
resist integration.  
In a speech before the Georgia Bar Association in 1956, Georgia 
Congressman James C. Davis came forward with a totally legislative argument, 
downplaying race and directing communist charges against both the Supreme Court 
justices and such organizations as the NAACP and Americans for Democratic 
Action.120 Designating the 1954 desegregation decision as the “hardest blow struck at 
our Constitution,” he went on to say that “instead of citing legal authority, it cited 
only sociological works and treatises. Many of the authors of the authorities cited are 
well-known to have numerous Communist front connections.”121 Reciting James F. 
Byrnes’ warning in 1954 about the need to “curb the court,” or otherwise the rest of 
the Nation, along with the South that was already hurt would be threatened by “this 
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usurpation by the Court,” he went on by explaining its influence outside the South as 
well: 
 The Court…[has a] dictatorial attitude and evident determination to 
centralize power in Washington,…, has already struck at other States far 
from Georgia and the South. In the case of Slochower vs. City of New 
York, just decided, the Court struck down a law of the City of New York 
which required the discharge of a teacher who invoked the Fifth 
Amendment and refused to answer when questioned as to membership in 
the Communist Party. From the State of Pennsylvania,…, the Court held 
that a Pennsylvania statute making subversive activities a criminal 
offense was unconstitutional…This ties the hands of law enforcement 
officers in every one of the 48 States so far as Communists and 
subversives are concerned…In the case of Communist Party of the 
United States of America vs. Subversive Activities Control Board, 
decided less than a month ago,…, the Supreme Court rendered one of its 
most amazing decisions.122  
 
It had decided against the findings of the board reached through the Court of 
Appeals, saying that the witnesses of the board (Paul Crouch, Harvey Matusow, and 
Manning Johnson) and the evidence surrounding them lack credibility, and should be 
rechecked. Seeing this as an intended process in which the actions of the Court of 
Appeals are delayed, he then went on with explaining his own research into the 17 
year period beginning with the year 1939, and into the ways in which the Supreme 
Court dealt with 28 Communism and subversion related cases, deciding in favor of 
Communists. He went on with a conspiratorial view, a radical change in the behavior 
of the Court is perceived, that threatened the American form of government and that 
allowed radical movements: “The strange tactics of this court within the past twenty 
years have … [changed] so radically as to transform itself from a dependable, 
responsible, and respected Court into an agency, which, …[lends] comfort and 
encouragement to radical movements and organizations which have grown bold and 
powerful during that period.”123 And from such pattern, he concluded that:  
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…the Court is a packed Court, and the personnel of the Court are 
reformers whose primary goal is to change this government of ours from 
a republic of Sovereign States into a bureaucratic central government, 
which shall be devoted not to the preservation of States’ Rights, local 
self-government and individual liberty, but shall be devoted to the 
promotion of socialistic doctrines, one-world government, and the radical 
philosophies of such groups as the Americans for Democratic Action, 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and similar 
left wing organizations. 124 
 
He then went on to explain in detail the so-called Communist affiliations of four 
Supreme Court appointments between the years 1937 and 1939, and concluded with 
the following section: 
One of the principal reasons that liberty has survived in America, while 
perishing in nearly every other section of the world, is that our 
government has been a government of laws and not a government of 
men…Our Constitution has been man-handled by political appointees, 
screened and approved by the National Association for the Advancement 
of Colored People and Americans for Democratic Action. Their practice 
has been, during their incumbency on the bench, to say the law is one 
thing today and something else tomorrow. They are destroying our 
Constitution and the rights of States and individuals, and we are being 
told that we must accept these outrageous and fraudulent violations of 
our Constitutional rights.125  
 
His speech was a confirmation of the kind of propaganda in which several issues of 
white southern concerns were brought together during the Massive Resistance era. 
Another similar speech by Eugene Cook in 1955, which was published and widely 
distributed throughout the region, was entitled “The Ugly Truth about the NAACP.” 
In the copy of the speech that he made before the 55th Annual Convention of the 
Peace Officers Association of Georgia in Atlanta, Cook presented the “the facts 
[that] have been uncovered, checked, assembled and correlated through many weeks 
of intensive investigation and cooperative effort by my Staff and the Staffs of 
Congressman James C. Davis of Georgia and Senator James O. Eastland of 
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Mississippi”.126 Beginning by stating that “the issue involved is not of race but rather 
of subversion” he went back to the origins of the NAACP and with reference to the 
Civil War, he declared: 
The record shows that the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People was neither founded nor is presently directed by colored 
people. It was originated in New York City 46 years ago as the brain 
child of a Southern scalawag journalist and Russian-trained revolutionary 
named William W. Walling. Its principal personalities during its early 
years were descendants of the rabble-rousing abolitionists who fomented 
the strife which precipitated the War Between the States, a conflict which 
would have been avoided but for the activities of those abolitionists.127 
 
He then went on with the communist affiliations of the only black founder and the 
current “honorary member” W.E.B. DuBbois, which he reached through the files of 
the HUAC. As his most recent activity, Cook noted about “the donation of his 
services in the preparation of legal briefs defending since-executed Communist spies 
Julius and Ethel Rosenberg and the imprisoned leaders of the Communist Party of 
the United States,” and added that in 1953 he was awarded the International Peace 
Prize, by the World Peace Council, which he defined as being a Communist front. He 
also noted that the series of conferences held by the council since 1949, to whose 
sponsorship DuBois participated, were “an attempt to undermine the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization.”128 After going on with the subversive affiliations of many 
members, he went back to DuBois’ contributions to Gunnar Myrdal’s book, An 
American Dilemma, which “was cited in its entirety by the Supreme Court as an 
authority for its ruling.” Again referring to HUAC findings, he noted that “15 other 
contributors to ‘An American Dilemma’ also have lengthy records of pro-
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Communist activity” and went on to elaborate on various other connections between 
the NAACP and communist activity. 129  
Such key addresses and various others were widely disseminated throughout 
the region, all echoing similar conspiratorial arguments. In the dissemination of the 
knowledge of these leaders throughout the region, the founding of the Citizens’ 
Councils all over the south would be a key development. Representative of the 
grassroots of the Massive Resistance as a “respectable alternative” to the radicalism 
of the Ku Klux Klan, these councils were the best examples of the merging of 
regional solidarity and anti-communism in the Cold War south. The first council was 
found in July, 1954, in Indianola, Mississippi and in April, 1956 an interstate 
meeting was held in New Orleans. These varied grassroots organization would also 
symbolize the earlier mentioned “civic minded” aspect of the people of the South. 
Along with many others, Georgia too, would establish its version of the citizens’ 
council, the States’ Rights Council of Georgia, with the cooperation of Roy Harris, 
Herman Talmadge and Governor Marvin Griffin.130  
The school cases pending before the Supreme Court encouraged the 
concerned and civic minded leaders of Mississippi too. Indeed, Mississippi, which 
Neil R. McMillen rightfully called “the mother of the movement,” was the state that 
formed the core of the resistance and the anti-communist outlook that accompanied 
it.131 The first council-like formation emerged here under the leadership of Robert B. 
Patterson. As early as 1953, he began lobbying among his close circle upon learning 
in a meeting in the Indianola School about the impending Supreme Court cases. And 
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anti-communism had from the start been an important issue of emphasis for 
Patterson. Even in the early letter that he wrote in response to the danger he 
perceived in the pending school cases, and that he published for distribution to 
friends, he warned about the need to “stand firm against communism and 
mongrelization.”132  
After the Mississippi Circuit Judge Thomas Pickens Brady delivered a key 
speech that encouraged Patterson, he began to recruit the cadre that would form the 
first Council. Patterson was at the time the manager of a large plantation, a former 
Mississippi University football star and a World War II paratrooper; and Brady was a 
Yale educated lawyer, and a former Dixiecrat (chairman of the speakers’ bureau of 
the States’ Rights Democratic Party). Made immediately after the Brown decision, 
Brady’s address noted that the ruling “like the Truman administration’s civil rights 
program, was “socialistic”.” He then expanded the speech into a ninety-page booklet 
under the title Black Monday, which would become the “inspiration and first 
handbook of the council movement.”133 Indeed, Patterson would say years later that 
“his decision to devote his life to resisting desegregation came after reading Black 
Monday.”134  
The councils are important for understanding the local origins of the Massive 
Resistance movement. However their rhetoric and ideology are particularly 
important in realizing how the segregationists increasingly took to an anti-communist 
campaign. Anti-communism would indeed be a key emphasis in the later stages of 
the resistance movement, when council activity began to seek national recognition 
and “the hard line on race was frequently muted in deference to broader issues of 
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concern to conservatives generally.”135 Judge Brady’s speech before the conservative 
Commonwealth Club of California in 1956 was illustrative of this ideological 
framework: 
[desegregation is] a small segment in the over-all plan to first socialize 
and then communize America…all constitutional, liberty loving citizens 
in this country will rise up in our defense and join hands with us in 
waging our lonely fight to protect and preserve America from Godless 
Communism!136  
 
The effectiveness of the councils and their specific effectiveness in red-baiting was 
also made clear by James C. Corman – Democrat Representative from California and 
a member of the House Judiciary Committee. Upon his trip to the South to explore 
the need for civil rights legislation, he shared his findings with the Californian 
newspaper Valley Times Today: 
With but few exceptions, we found that every level of public and private 
opinion was committed to maintaining…segregation…. The White 
Citizens Councils are active throughout the state …In this atmosphere it 
came as no surprise to us when several people told us that they believed 
that Communists were behind the Negro movement for equal rights…. 
There are only a few white citizens who have the courage to publicly 
support the Negro cause…[for fear of] economic reprisals and threats of 
physical violence.137 
 
This description established a direct connection between the activities of the 
Citizens Councils and the extent of anti-communist and segregationist public 
opinion. One other important conclusion in this was the fact that grassroots behavior 
was an important player in shaping the attitudes of the policy makers as well.  
The speech of a Mississippi educated lawyer, banker, and a tree farmer of 
forty years, owning several hundred acres, Hugh V. Wall, was one example to the 
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anti-communist and segregationist sentiment in the simple language of the 
grassroots. He was also a member of the Democratic Advisory Council of the State 
of Mississippi appointed by the National Democratic Committee. Made before the 
Mississippi Bar Association in 1955, his speech was an assault on the legitimacy of 
the desegregation decision of the Supreme Court. Wall began by stating that “the 
United States of America has been considered by our people and known to civilized 
world as a government by the people. This historic and sacred right was taken away 
from the people by nine men… [to change] our form of government from that of a 
government by the people to that of a government by the Supreme Court of the 
United States.” 138  Further explaining how the state governments were 
constitutionally designed to deal with the problems of their own people, he said that 
the desegregation decision of the Court “assumed that nine men were better qualified 
than the parents of the children, or the local community, or the state to say how our 
public schools should be run.”139 He then went on by stating that the decision was 
“based upon the unreasonable foundation of psychology, sociology and 
anthropology” and that “there is involved in this segregation of the races in our 
public schools, a deliberate plan on the part of the Communists to destroy our form 
of government.”140 His evidence was a list of goals stated by the Communist Party 
Convention in 1928 defending the abolition of racially unjust practices, and the 
Supreme Court’s “following so closely [this] Communist Party platform.”141 In the 
closing section, he outwardly defended his position against the mixing of the two 
races. Referring to the statement of the court that segregation created a feeling of 
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inferiority that might affect the hearts and minds of black children “in a way unlikely 
ever to be undone”, he said: 
….they [referring to those who endorse the decision] appear to forget 
that white children have a heart and mind that will be affected in a way 
unlikely ever to be undone, and they forget that the mixing of the races in 
the public schools would inevitably mean the mixing of the blood and the 
mixing of the blood would mean a destruction of both the white race and 
the negro race. Then the question is, are we more interested in the hearts 
and minds of the negro children than we are in the perpetuation of the 
purity of each race, and the life of the white race?....[Then quoting the 
famous statesman of the Antebellum period, Daniel Webster, he 
concluded:] “…if the blood of our white race should become corrupted 
and mingled with the blood of Africa, then the present greatness of the 
United States of America would be destroyed and all hope for the future 
would be forever gone. The maintenance of the American civilization 
would be as impossible for a negroid America as would the redemption 
and restoration of the white man’s blood which had been mixed with that 
of a negro.”142 
 
Another key figure in Mississippi was William J. Simmons, whom McMillen defined 
as the most responsible person in the coming together of the various councils across 
the region and to “begin effectively to coordinate organized racism in the South.” 
Unlike the “parochial former football captain Patterson,” Simmons was the educated 
son of one of the most successful bankers. He had widely traveled Europe in his 
youth and went to Sorbonne, France to study French Literature, and when World 
War II broke out, he came back to the United States to serve in the Navy. “Projecting 
the image of respectability that the movement so ardently sought,” the center of 
Mississippi council’s organization would shift to Jackson under Simmons’ leadership 
(by 1960s), with Patterson still the executive secretary in the Greenwood office.143  
Simmons too resorted to anti-communism in public campaigns, although he 
personally had doubts about too much of an emphasis on communism that would 
divert attention from the issue of race. In an occasion similar to Judge Brady’s, he 
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resorted to a softer rhetoric, still revolving around conservative anti-communistic 
themes. In a 1958 speech in Iowa, “he sketched a fearful portrait of encroaching 
federalism and creeping collectivism in which the Brown decision was but one of 
many portentous deviations from constitutionalism effected by New Dealers, Fair 
Dealers and “totalitarian ‘liberals’.” 144 In fact the more entrenched problem that lay 
beneath “the conspiracy theory of racial problems” as he saw it was “the wave of 
equalitarian philosophy that started in the early part of the twentieth century 
with…John Dewey…[,that] permeated the very fabric of American education 
and,….this spirit of equality [that] “resulted directly in the Supreme Court school-
integration decision”. ” 145  However, when he made public addresses or wrote 
columns on the Council’s journal, he repeatedly used the adjectives “communist-
inspired” or “communist-dominated” while referring to the integration movement.146 
Despite the insincerity, the fact that he resorted to communist influences revealed the 
effectiveness of such rhetoric.  
As the addresses of these Mississippian resisters reveal, anti-communism 
proved flexible enough a weapon both on the local and national context, to counter 
moderacy on racial progress. George Lewis frequently noted in his The White South 
and the Red Menace that southern leaders of the resistance used anti-communism to 
tone down an outright racist rhetoric. Moreover, just as anti-communism enabled an 
easier reach for the national audience; in the locale it proved an effective 
complement to such arguments as states’ rights, fears of miscegenation and 
amalgamation of the races.147  
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Such respectable and civic minded citizens who were in close proximity to 
the grassroots were the initiators of both the movement and the anti-communist 
frame the rhetoric gained. However, important political figures of the state, with 
political experience in the U. S. Congress or the Senate also had their contribution. 
As noted before, such federal institutions as HUAC, FBI, or SISS happened to be the 
centers of information and tactics that southern leaders used during the Massive 
Resistance era, along with local ones.  
One such important person in Mississippi was Congressman John Rankin, 
who was the chairman to HUAC during 1945-1946. Just as Brady, Simmons, and 
Patterson attached communism to their anti-New Deal, anti-Truman, or anti-
equalitarian ideas, Rankin’s focus was mostly on miscegenation. Warning about the 
intention of fellow travelers to mongrelize the whole nation and the communist plan 
to create social chaos, he told in a speech before the Speaker of the House, that “the 
Communists and pink parlors of this country…are trying to browbeat the American 
Red Cross into taking the labels off the blood bank they are building up for our boys 
in the service so that it will not show whether it is Negro blood or white blood.”148 
As Jeff Woods pointed out, southerners had used HUAC to “wrap their region’s 
racial agenda in the American flag and tie southern security to national 
security…[and to] apply racist doctrines to the anti-Communist cause since the 
committee’s beginning.”149 Although Rankin gave up HUAC chairmanship in 1947, 
he continued to be what Woods called the “spiritual leader.” And it was under his 
leadership that year that the committee began pursuing radicalism among blacks with 
most sincerity. He talked in 1947 about a “great octopus, communism, which is out 
to destroy everything,” explaining the racial disturbances in the South. In 1948 there 
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had been some more disturbances in the South during Henry Wallace’s presidential 
campaign, in which his supporters were attacked during rallies and he was thrown 
rotten vegetables with appellations such as “Communist” and “nigger lover.”150 
Rankin again declared in Congress, blaming the events on Wallace and Communists, 
that the racial reforms they sought were the cover for “Marxist subversion.”151  
During the following years, the committee would produce reports and hold 
hearings to point out to subversive elements within such civil rights organizations as 
CIO, CRC, and SCHW. This according to Woods, along with the southern response 
to Truman’s racial policies, was “a clear indication that red and black fears had 
become a defining element of the region’s ideology; [and, that] the southern red 
scare was under way.”152 On the eve of the founding of the State Rights party, 
Rankin would issue a call to fellow southerners to “stop these smearing Communists 
who would creep into every bureau and every commission that is appointed and 
attempt to undermine and destroy everything our people have fought for and 
everything we hold dear.”153 During the Massive Resistance era, such rhetoric would 
continue with increasing intensity and federal tactics would be transferred down 
south, allying itself with the longstanding southern local anti-communist sentiment.  
McMillen also highlighted this continuity by stating that “just as an earlier 
generation of conservative Americans had seen a frightful red specter lurking behind 
labor unrest, the New Deal’s “coddling” of the Negro, and such wartime innovations 
as the FECP, the disquieted Southerner of the post-Brown period regarded the Negro 
revolution as a product of the “Communist conspiracy”.”154 The most influential 
figure in Mississippi during this period that echoed Rankin, was Senator James O. 
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Eastland. Just as Rankin developed his anti-communist ideas and strategies under 
HUAC, Eastland developed his in the Senate. He was a young lawyer and a cotton-
plantation owner, who grew up in a small town near Jackson, having “the lifestyle 
and world view of the conservative white ruling elite.”155After a brief experience in 
national politics, upon his appointment by the governor to a temporary position in the 
Senate in 1941, he won reelection to a full term next year, thanks to the support of 
the agricultural community.156 His racism and his belief in the ties between civil 
rights reform and subversion were often reflected in his remarks, even before he rose 
to his seat in the SISS. During the Dixiecrat movement, of which he was a staunch 
supporter157, he declared that Truman’s civil rights stance showed how “organized 
mongrel minorities control[ed] the government… [and how they were trying to] 
Harlemize the country.”158 In 1950, he gained membership in the new SISS, upon his 
support to a fellow Democrat in his call for the resignation of the secretary of state 
Dean Acheson, “whom Eastland accused of sympathizing with pro-Soviet advisers in 
the State Department.”159  
Just as Rankin used his position in HUAC, Senator Eastland used his 
seniority position in the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee “to import federal 
red-baiting committees to the South.” 160  Even before he was preaching the 
interposition resolution all over the South as the best possible solution to the problem 
of states’ rights in 1956, he had already begun tracing communists in the region. In 
1954, he was the central figure in one of the events that M. J. Heale characterizes as 
“well-publicized congressional episodes…[that] brought reminders of the threat of 
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red subversion” down South.161 Early that year, he led “a one-man visitation” to New 
Orleans, to investigate into the Southern Conference Educational Fund. SCEF was a 
tax exempt organization headed by James Dombrowski, which was initiated by the 
SCHW in 1946, and which saw segregation and discrimination as the reason to 
South’s problems. The organization also had the support of many New Dealers, 
leftist southerners, and civil rights activists. Early in March 1954, its board members 
were called in by the subcommittee to be present at the New Orleans hearings. Two 
of the board members, Aubrey Williams and Virginia Durr, requested the senate 
majority leader Lyndon Baines Johnson’s help, upon which Johnson persuaded two 
key subcommittee members into not attending the hearings.162 Hearings went on 
under Eastland’s leadership and SCEF’s lineage to SCHW was traced, Dombrowski 
and an attorney he had once worked with (despite having no official connection to 
SCEF) were charged with having ties to the Communist Party. When Eastland 
ordered another board member Myles Horton be ejected, he was forcibly dragged out 
of the room. While Eastland closed the hearings, he still declared a “pledge to 
continue his general investigation into the activities of the Communist Party in the 
South. As the crowd was leaving the room, heated discussions resulted in the 
interference of Federal marshals in the scene. The hearings were a failure, and again 
faced with pressures from Lyndon Johnson, the SISS had to cancel another set of 
hearings in Birmingham, Alabama.163  However, despite the failure and even the 
opposition of some fellow southerners to Eastland’s McCarthy-like tactics, “the 
hearings implicated a number of prominent southern liberals in the Communist 
conspiracy…[and] the loyalty of southerners sympathetic to integration had been 
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impugned.” 164  Moreover, simultaneous on the federal scene, were the Army-
McCarthy hearings, upon which many southerners felt McCarthy was being 
“crucified” by a federal government that increasingly and disappointingly supported 
racial integration. The earlier mentioned influential Georgia political figure Roy 
Harris, commented on the episode, saying “the ghost of Communism will rise to 
haunt Eisenhower and all these peanut officials in Washington who are joining up 
with the howling mob today.” 165 
Thus, just as the red scare on the federal level was coming to an end, its 
legacy came down south, making use of the federal tactics and material that had been 
built up in the previous decade. As Jeff Woods pointed out, two months after the 
hearings in New Orleans, the Brown decision came along, and seven months later, 
the Senate censured McCarthy. Although both McCarthy’s and Eastland’s extreme 
and reckless tactics were disfavored as more dangerous to American ideals than the 
threat that might be posed by groups such as the SCEF, “the renewed interest among 
racially conservative southerners in attributing the civil rights movement to alien 
influences…would carry the red scare into the looming battle against school 
integration.”166 
Eastland of Mississippi would still be the central figure in the South who led 
the anti-communist aspect of the resistance. He paid visits to other southern states 
and frequently made key addresses in Citizens’ Councils meetings. One such address 
was made into a booklet entitled “We have reached an era of Judicial Tyranny”, 
which was basically the text of his speech before the statewide convention of the 
Association of the Citizens’ Councils of Mississippi, held in December 1, 1955. The 
address stated that the Court “[had] perpetrated a monstrous crime. It presents a clear 
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threat…not only to the law, customs, traditions, and racial integrity of Southern 
people, but also to the foundations of our Republican form of Government.”167 This 
statement combining a southern regional identity, white supremacy and a perceived 
threat to governmental structure was a powerful common stance in the South to take 
to appease the public, without regard to the extent of extremity or the leniency of the 
rhetoric. Merging the above statement into an introduction talking about the founding 
fathers, he went on explaining how the government was threatened by subversive 
groups:  
…these decisions [for integration] were dictated by political pressure 
groups bent upon the destruction of the American system of government, 
and the mongrelization of the white race…the Court has responded to a 
radical pro-communist political movement in this country…. This thing 
is broader and deeper than the N.A.A.C.P. It is true that N.A.A.C.P. is 
the front and the weapon to force integration…It is backed by large 
organizations with tremendous power, who are attempting with success 
to mold the climate of public opinion, to brainwash and indoctrinate the 
American people to accept racial integration and mongrelization...In 
general they are church groups, radical organizations, labor unions and 
liberal groups of all shades of Red.168 
 
Eastland then went on with this simultaneously segregationist, anti-communist, and 
conspiratorial Cold Warrior rhetoric, noting that children were brainwashed and 
indoctrinated in public schools and that the real danger was the more moderate states 
of the south, as Mississippi would not let this succeed.  
Some fellow politicians also encouraged this special interest of the senator in 
subversives within the context of civil rights reform. For example, in a private letter 
to Eastland dated March 15, 1956 (the year Eastland assumed the Chairmanship of 
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the whole judiciary Committee169), the South Carolina Senator Olin D. Johnston, 
warned him that an investigation resolution into the desegregation decision of the 
Court, which they co-sponsored the year before, had been delayed for a year.170 He 
reminded Eastland of the conclusion they reached that much of the material used by 
the Supreme Court in reaching its decision “originated from writings and other works 
developed from pink, red or actually communistic sources.”171 He noted that the 
resolution should be resumed immediately and requested the Chair to appoint a 
special subcommittee “as there is nothing more urgent on this subject at this time 
than this investigation…. It would be tragic indeed for a decree of the Supreme Court 
be implemented upon the people of this country should that decree be based on 
communistic-inspired writings.”172 Such small scale but direct political pressures, 
along with the one from the grassroots, was an important element of the ideology 
building process of such figures as Eastland. Eastland would produce another 
pamphlet that took its place among propaganda circles, which was entitled “Is the 
Supreme Court pro-Communist?” It was the text of Eastland’s speech in the Senate 
on May 2, 1962. He was then the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee. The 
pamphlet noted in the preface that it would make clear “the major trend of our times 
– our relinquishment of personal liberty, our sidle into socialism.”173 Regarding the 
authority of the Supreme Court to shape states’ politics, the document talked greatly 
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about the tyrannical and socialistic aspect of the Court and historical aspect of this. 
Referring to the statistical research he had brought together, he said: 
In the 24 years – 1919 to 1942 – the Court decided only 11 cases in this 
category [involving Communism and subversion]. Of these 11, the first 7 
were decided against the Communist position and in favor of the 
Government…. from 1943 through 1953, a total of 34 cases in the 
described category were considered. A majority of the Court voted in 
favor of the position advocated by the Communists in 15 cases, and held 
contrary to what the Communists wanted in 19 cases…In the 7 ½ years 
since [Earl Warren became Chief Justice], the Court had the enormous 
total of 70 cases or more…46 of these sustained the position advocated 
by the communists…174  
 
What he revealed was both an increase in the number of Communism related cases 
and an increase in the tendency to decide in favor of the Communist side. With the 
sharp increase he suggested in 1953, he saw the behavior of Warren Court as an 
indication of the realization of a long-term communist influence. He contextualized 
this remark by stating that “in the recent constitutional history of this Nation, the 
Supreme Court of the United States has infringed, invaded, and usurped the powers 
vested by the Constitution in the legislative branch of the Federal Government.” 175 
He then went on saying “it is a mockery for Congress when…nine men appointed for 
life…. can arrogate onto themselves the power to dictate to the sovereign States how 
they shall conduct their internal affairs…”176 He then went on again with the anti-
communist rhetoric warning of the danger “that threatens the basic security of our 
country from the onslaught of the Communist conspiracy from without and 
within….” It was after these remarks combining the pro states’ rights and anti-
communist that he went into the details of his statistical survey, which he had 
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prepared during the years that encompassed the Little Rock integration crisis of 1957 
and completed in 1958.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
 THE CASE OF ORVAL FAUBUS 
 
 
3.1 Ineffective Moderacy in Arkansas 
The Deep South States, as explained in the preceding sections, played a 
central role in the crystallization of resistance to desegregation in public schools as a 
movement all throughout the South, by providing the ideological basis and 
promoting this collection of ideas through various means of effective propaganda. 
Moreover, simultaneously with the tendency in federal court decisions towards 
desegregation in public schools long before the 1954 Brown decision of the Supreme 
Court, the Deep South, with Georgia, South Carolina and Mississippi on the lead, 
had already begun very early in the decade initiating legislation and programs that 
openly challenged this trend.177  
Interestingly, however, it was in one of the states of the upper south that the 
Massive Resistance reached its peak and manifested itself in 1957, with the most 
notable and internationally acknowledged Massive Resistance crisis of the Cold War 
era. The crisis over integration of Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas, 
brought the Federal Government and a southern State in direct conflict, in which the 
Arkansas Governor Orval Eugene Faubus opted for resistance. The event would turn 
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Arkansas into a fortress of Massive Resistance, despite its being, one of the most 
moderate states in the South in terms of race relations and the critical developments 
in Little Rock would determine the eventual fate of the movement.  
In the following sections, the focus will be on how the dual dynamics of 
Massive Resistance and anti-communism played out in Arkansas, “transforming” 
this Upper South state not only into a silent legislative center for resistance, but 
differently from the rest of the Upper South, into a place where outwardly 
segregationist and vocal resistance turned into a showdown. Although Faubus’ own 
personal decision - to act in favor of segregation and overtly challenge the authority 
of the Federal Government – created the crisis, the background to his eventual 
behavior as a political opportunist exhibited important insights into the mostly 
overlooked conservative base in the state. This conservative base had much in 
common with the Deep South, in terms of its views of both segregation and anti-
communism, and offered a receptive audience to the rhetoric of Massive Resistance, 
that already reached Arkansas and made visible an important majority for Faubus to 
play to.  
George Lewis, in his The White South and the Red Menace, treated North 
Carolina and Virginia in a similar context, as the two states of the Upper South that 
“in particular…provided the legislative foundations for determined, long-term 
resistance.”178 Looking at the occasional failures of anti-communism as a Massive 
Resistance tool, he also challenged the oversimplified notion of the Massive 
Resistance movement as a monolith, elite driven and highly-organized effort. He 
demonstrated that the Massive Resistance rhetoric and the extent of determination in 
the defiance of Brown, showed important variations, which revealed itself in the 
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variety of the ways anti-communism was employed as a tool. Lewis assigned this 
difference from the Deep South, to the fact that “the politicians [of the Upper South] 
were forced to take into account more diverse constituencies and a broader range of 
opinions on the race issue.”179  For both states, he traced a general split among 
resisters that put forward two main factions, between defenders of a purely 
legislative strategy and deniers of even token desegregation. Among the two factions, 
the latter camp tended to include those who preferred an anti-communist rhetoric.180  
Notwithstanding this side of the issue, the following treatment of the dual 
forces of Massive Resistance and anti-communism in Arkansas, will focus more on 
the conservative commonalities in the South culminating in the incidents in Little 
Rock, also trying to reveal certain conditions and personalities complicating the 
events. Indeed, Arkansas was the state in which the political scientist V. O. Key Jr. 
could locate “no state-wide factional organization with either cohesion or 
continuity… [but instead a] multiplicity of transient and personal factions.”181 Key 
also stated that in Arkansas, “more than in almost any other southern state, social and 
economic issues of significance to people have lain ignored in the confusion and 
paralysis of disorganized factional politics.”182 Fitting with such analysis, the politics 
in Arkansas, before and during the outbreak of the crisis in Little Rock revolved 
around a state-wide conservative consensus about the double issues of anti-
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communism and segregation, which were made visible only during election 
campaigns, when brought up by certain competing politicians.  
The controversy in Little Rock unexpectedly revealed this conservative 
sentiment in the State that resisted immediate integration. Otherwise, in 1954, the 
Central High school board had declared to comply with the Supreme Court’s 
decision to integrate public schools. Despite Arkansas’ becoming like a fortress of 
Massive Resistance with the Little Rock integration crisis, it had been before the 
incident, one of the most promising states in the south in terms of race relations. Both 
Faubus and Governor Sid McMath before him were “the two leading practitioners of 
biracial politics in the region.”183 Faubus was indeed raised in the political school of 
McMath and together they represented a liberal wing of Arkansas politics for years. 
They both had liberal economic policies that helped lower income whites and blacks, 
and their policies considered the increasing black voters’ concerns. They defended 
increased support for black institutions, appointed blacks to important political 
positions, and took public stance against lynching and poll tax.184  
Unlike the situation in most southern states during late 1940s and early 
1950s, both governors won gubernatorial elections against conservative and 
segregationist candidates. Even in the South’s most critical year, 1950, McMath won 
over the conservative governor Ben Laney. That year, the Supreme Court handed 
down the three segregation related cases, Sweatt, McLaurin, and Henderson, 
triggering a white conservative response in most of the Southern states. Even in 
North Carolina and Florida, gubernatorial elections were dominated by segregationist 
campaigns and resulted in the loss of liberals. And in the Deep South, most important 
victories that contributed most to the rise of Massive Resistance politics took place – 
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that of the leading segregationist and anti-communist Herman Talmadge in Georgia, 
and of the strongest anti-Truman and anti-integration force in the region James F. 
Byrnes in South Carolina. While these segregationist white southern forces were in 
consolidation, McMath defeated Governor Ben Laney, who was a renowned 
Dixiecrat and also the chairman to the National States’ Rights Committee in 1949, 
without “letting” matters of race become a campaign issue.  
Only in 1952 McMath lost against Francis Cherry in the race for 
governorship, but the campaign was again centered on his liberal economic policies 
and pro-Truman and left wing stance. Even in Faubus’s gubernatorial victory against 
Cherry in 1954, race was not an issue. Cherry had already announced, right after the 
Supreme Court handed down the Brown decision, that Arkansas would not defy the 
order. Instead, he preferred to resort to anti-communist tactics that had taken its hold 
in the rest of the region. What he did to counter Faubus was to carry his tactic (that 
he previously used against McMath) of appealing to the conservative backlash and 
anti-communist consensus, to a level compared to McCarthy’s. He developed the 
campaign on his findings that, as a youth, Faubus had attended the Commonwealth 
College, notorious for being a socialistic establishment. He also drew attention to the 
socialist background that Faubus’s family had.  
Faubus was still victorious, although his political boss McMath had to face 
defeat that year in the race for the Senate against conservative and anti-communist 
John L. McClellan. Thus, still in his 1954 gubernatorial victory that took place in the 
immediate context of Brown, anti-communism rather than segregation was on the 
agenda. However, during the next gubernatorial election, he had to counter James D. 
Johnson, who combined a staunch anti-communist and segregationist campaign and 
it was during this term as governor that Faubus’ tone began to change. Although his 
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own personal history as well did not point to a prejudice against blacks, Faubus 
eventually turned in 1957 into the icon that personified the intolerant white southern 
racist, and Arkansas became the fortress of Massive Resistance. Although, his own 
personal decisions and the specific conditions of the Arkansas atmosphere initially 
fed the events in Little Rock, the segregationist forces of Massive Resistance and an 
anti-communist sentiment, working in the background seemed to contribute greatly 
to Faubus’s unexpected segregationist stance during the crisis.  
The magnitude of the confrontation in Little Rock was unexpected, especially 
among liberal and moderate circles, which were initially supporters of Orval Faubus 
and expected their State to be the possible forerunner in the peaceful implementation 
of Brown. However in the state, there was a mostly unpronounced anti-integration 
sentiment, which produced the silence that they assumed as consent. Moreover, even 
less pronounced was an anti-communist, anti-outsider sentiment that added onto the 
difficult position of moderacy. Thus, their own definition of themselves as 
“moderates” was part of the unnoticed obstacle before the reorganization of the racial 
norms in their community. All of them were part of the liberal southern politicians, 
who, in the definition of Tony Badger, “appealed to a cross alliance of lower-income 
whites, blacks, veterans, women, and labor…,[and who] believed that the economic 
progress that New-Deal style policies could achieve would gradually eliminate racial 
tensions. They played down the race issue, and espoused a policy of gradualism, 
rarely challenging segregation itself.” 185  Although it was the safest course for 
politicians, it was also a stressful position to maintain, especially in Arkansas where 
the general constituency that Badger noted was much more complicated. 
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Moreover, for most black people at the time, moderacy had different 
overtones. Interviewed by Beth Roy, Jerome Muldrew, a black student attending the 
all-black Dunbar High School during the crisis at Little Rock, reflected this dilemma. 
Although feeling betrayed and hurt by Faubus’ turn into the segregationist camp, he 
said he “just simply signed it off as being politics…Because you see, we were 
considered a moderate state, but then if you’re a moderate state it meant you can turn 
either way, you could either become a segregationist, or not-a-segregationist.”186  
It was a flexible position that might bend to either side, offering both hopes 
for progress and a risk of equal strength toward the other end. Moreover, in such a 
delicate political atmosphere, both the personal decisions of politicians and their own 
conception of themselves about whether they were politically qualified enough in the 
eyes of the public tended to have great importance. As Key rightly noted in his 
specific analysis of Arkansas politics, the overall consensus in basic political issues 
left only the issue about “who is the ‘best qualified’ candidate, or what is the best 
way to do what everyone…who has a hand in the state’s politics, agrees ought to be 
done…[in the common assumption that] all persons are loyal to the state.”187 Thus, 
where “personalities and emotions of the moment” defined election returns and 
where the personal competence of the politician meant a lot, personal insecurities had 
a lot to offer in the understanding of events – especially the ones unfolding in Little 
Rock. In the face of a rising appeal for Massive Resistance, which made segregation 
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“the issue” in the wake of the crisis, all moderate politicians contributed to what 
amounted to Faubus’ segregationist stance.  
One example of the delicate position of moderacy in the State was that of the 
conciliatory congressman Brooks Hays. In hopes of preventing the crisis, Hays 
personally directed a secret conference between Faubus and Eisenhower, using his 
Washington ties and the sympathy he held in national politics as a liberal southerner. 
That was a meeting that took place at the Naval Base in New Port, Rhode Island – 
only 11 days before the President federalized the Arkansas National Guard and 
announced that he would deploy additional federal troops to Little Rock in 
September 24, 1957.188 He was a moderate, an advocate of gradual integration, who 
avoided taking sides and considered both the proponents of an all-out segregation 
and the insistent NAACP as extremist “creatures of freedom” born out of the “risks 
our governmental system include.” According to him, “one [could] oppose, as I do, 
the national organization’s [NAACP’s] strategy and still believe strongly in their 
right to function as an agent of their people’s interests, just as I believe that White 
Citizens Councils should not be prevented by court procedures or otherwise from 
holding meetings or propagating their views.”189 He was requested by Mayor Mann 
to appear in a secret meeting of the moderate leaders of the state, right after Faubus 
withdrew the National Guard on September 20 and flew to Georgia to attend the 
Southern Governors Conference. Hays attended on superintendent Virgil Blossom’s 
advice, informing him that his help might be needed in devising strategies to prevent 
violence. Thus, he attended the meeting against his worries that “it might draw me 
into the orbit of political opposition to Governor Faubus.” He made the above 
mentioned remark about the extremism of NAACP, for explaining his unwillingness 
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to have any contact with the organization “either national or local”, upon realizing 
that the meeting’s purpose developed into protecting the black kids rather than 
preventing violence.190 Hays was worried and insecure, because he was aware of the 
peoples’ growing uneasiness in the community about the changes imposed on the 
very local and sensitive issue of desegregation in public schools, plus his own 
unwillingness to appear to public as taking the integrationist side. In this insecurity, 
like Faubus, a liberal political and personal record had an important part.  
During the 1930s, Hays had been serving as a member of the Democratic 
National Committee, during which time he unsuccessfully ran twice for governorship 
and once for Congress, as a young social reformer. In 1934 he was also appointed as 
chief of the legal and labor compliance responsibilities in the National Recovery 
Administration’s Arkansas office. That year he was invited by the Virginian scholar 
and politician Francis Pickens Miller (a later leader of the anti-Byrd forces in 
Virginia) to join a meeting in Atlanta, with representatives from all over the south 
aiming to organize “to alert southern leadership to the grave problems of farm 
tenancy, low incomes, racial discrimination, disfranchisement due to poll tax laws, 
discriminatory freight rates, elective irregularities, and other social ills.” He traveled 
extensively throughout the South, on missions for the Southern Policy Committee, 
born out of that meeting, although “the conservative farm groups looked askance at 
us, largely because of our emphasis upon the plight of the tenants and 
sharecroppers.” In 1935 he met Henry A. Wallace, who was then the Secretary of 
Agriculture, and he was appointed to the Farm Security Administration (then called 
Resettlement Administration.)191 
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Such liberal record would trouble him in his career as a Congressman. When 
in 1942 he ran for Congress, his opponent campaigned by “great bundles of circulars, 
page sized, inflaming feelings on the race issue” and brought up Hays’ attendance at 
the 1938 Southern Conference on Human Welfare (which would have to disband in 
1948) meeting in Birmingham. He made his defense, with the help of Arkansas 
Gazette editor John F. Wells, being careful not to “negate [his] concern for the 
welfare of the black people.” 192  The advertisements they produced included 
newspaper clippings “showing that [he] had left the 1939 Birmingham conference 
before an active minority, some of whom had been influenced by Communist 
propaganda, put through all kinds of extreme and unrealistic resolutions that were 
later repudiated” and finished with a resolution of the Women’s society of the 
Methodist Church condemning the use of the issue of race in political campaigns.193 
Hays noted that his opponent’s campaign was “an attack upon me as ‘a dangerous 
radical’.” Thus, being too interested in the improvement of the lot of blacks was 
immediately perceived as a radical left wing tendency. He also mentioned how, 
during his years as a congressman, his “efforts in the Roosevelt-inspired program of 
relating the rural poor more viably, and thus more equitably, to the land sometimes 
brought recriminations and violent personal attacks… [including the one when he] 
was once denounced by a representative in the Arkansas legislature as ‘a 
Communist’;” and how he was constantly blocked for “being persona non grata to 
some members of the Arkansas political establishment…even in the more acceptable 
conservation measures.”194  
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Another early Faubus supporter was Sid McMath, who had been the governor 
between the years 1949 – 1952 with a post-war progressive business approach, 
assisted by others in Arkansas politics such as the Senator J. William Fulbright, 
Congressman Hays, and who indeed introduced Faubus to Arkansas politics. 
McMath was also supported by the Arkansas Gazette editor Harry Ashmore, who 
joined the Gazette in the fall of 1947 in the immediate context of Truman’s special 
commission released its report, To Secure These Rights. On his arrival, he 
immediately began politicizing against Governor Ben T. Laney - McMath’s 
conservative predecessor, who had assumed the chairmanship of the southern faction 
that would be called Dixiecrats, committed to opposing Truman’s nomination. In an 
early radio debate, Ashmore forcefully argued against Laney who “emphasized his 
opposition to the president’s endorsement of anti-lynching, anti-poll tax, anti-
segregation, and Fair Employment Practices Commission legislation, calling all of it 
unconstitutional and even communistic.”195  
Such anti-communist and segregationist sentiment would also be directed 
against McMath and Ashmore. McMath’s 1952 defeat in the gubernatorial elections 
was the result of “a combination of popular outrage over questionable dealings in his 
highway department [chaired by Faubus], opposition from the mighty Arkansas 
Power & Light Company, and a revulsion against Truman.”196  In the victory of 
Francis Cherry, the company was an important sponsor, revealing the restricting 
impact of conservative business, which was also anti-communist and had an interest 
in preserving the racial statu quo although the issue was not directly raised in this 
particular election. The company’s president was one of the several “leading 
industrial managers and promoters,” whom Ashmore conferred during the “Ashmore 
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Project” and whose “style of a country preacher on behalf of the private utilities’ 
crusade against the ‘creeping socialism’ of public power…was typical.”197  After 
Francis Cherry’s assuming governorship, the letter that an associate justice of the 
Arkansas Supreme Court wrote to Cherry also signaled the increasing suspicion 
against the liberal camp, resembling the anti-communist rhetoric of resistance 
spreading from the Deep South: “One of the most tragic phases of the McMath fiasco 
was that he followed, blindly and explicitly, the Harry-Harry (Truman-Ashmore) 
philosophy of socialism….I predict that your worst headache will not be with the 
Legislature, as Mr.Ashmore assumes, but rather with the Gazette and its policy of 
higher taxes and more socialism.”198 In 1954, McMath ran for the senate and lost 
against John L. McClellan, who had gained his seat in 1942 together with the 
Mississippi Senator James O. Eastland representing “an anti-New Deal, anti-
communist, and anti-black force in the South that hoped to reassert its power against 
Roosevelt’s unionized, ethnic, and statist coalition.”199  
Thus, a tendency of quickly associating racial and social reform with 
radicalism and communism was not nonexistent in Arkansas’ history and it had great 
role to play in both shaping the hesitant and insecure behavior of policy makers and 
reminding of the overall conservatism prevalent in the community, especially when 
racial issues were at stake – which was mostly what happened in Little Rock in 1957. 
Moreover, it revealed the complexity of the coexistence of anti-communism and 
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segregationist sentiment in the “moderate” state of the Upper South. In the Deep 
South, both sentiments were solid and obviously more entrenched, although both 
communist activity and racially reformist activity were almost nonexistent. 
Moreover, the negative public reaction against the Court was so obvious in the Deep 
South that, a few governors like James P. Coleman of Mississippi, Earl K. Long of 
Louisiana, and James E. Folsom of Alabama “cautioned their segregationist citizens 
against overreacting.”200  
In contrast to the Deep South, Arkansas did have a progressive 
“establishment” which was both liberal and racially moderate and it did have some 
episodes evoking an anti-communist response.201 What complicated the situation in 
Arkansas was the fact that this liberal circle was cut off from the grassroots in social 
matters, thus mostly unaware of the extent of both segregationist sentiment in the 
white community, which would easily be affected by the forced of Massive 
Resistance emanating from the Deep South, and of the discontent among the black 
population. This hesitant and fragile status of moderacy made it possible for the 
forces of Massive Resistance reach out to the people of Arkansas during the Little 
Rock integration crisis; and the anti-communist rhetoric it employed greatly 
increased its success, by further intimidating the governor, whose past proved to be 
even more troubling than Hays’, McMath’s or even Ashmore’s. 
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3.2 1954 Gubernatorial – Red Scare Politics  
Faubus defined his “moderate” stance in the same fashion that Hays did. In 
the section of his autobiography, Down From the Hills, where he explained his 
signing of the Southern Manifesto, he remarked that “the voices of reason, speaking 
for law and proper means, were already being drowned out by the integration 
extremists and political opportunists on both sides…the main question for all office 
holders faced with the problem [whether to sign the manifesto] was political death or 
survival.”202 Hays, was also among the officials who signed it, when it came before 
the Arkansas Congressional delegation in March, 1956. Like Hays, Faubus had a 
liberal record, having been raised in the political school of Sid McMath, from whom 
he took over in 1954. As a returning GI, Faubus had campaigned for McMath in the 
1948 gubernatorial election and brought about McMath’s victory in his home county, 
after which he became a member to the Highway Commission. He later assumed the 
chairmanship of the commission and became McMath’s administrative assistant.203 
In 1954, the same year McMath lost the seat in the Senate against McClellan, Faubus 
ran against Cherry in the governors’ race.  
The race was initially of a nature that V. O. Key Jr. described – one with no 
serious philosophical differences (about the Court Ruling), discussing instead how 
things should be run and revolving around the personal competence of candidates to 
run things (mostly economic reform.) In contrast to the situation in the Deep South, 
the gubernatorial race in Arkansas completely ignored the matter. As Bartley noted, 
in Georgia and South Carolina where the Brown decision of May 17, 1954 became 
“the issue…inundating all others, as politicians maneuvered frantically to occupy the 
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extreme segregationist position.” 204  The day the decision was announced by the 
Court, Governor Cherry had announced compliance and stated that Arkansas would 
“meet the requirements of the decision.”205 However, as Faubus recorded, Cherry’s 
mood began to change – something that Faubus related to the turmoil in Sheridan on 
May 22, in which the “patrons of the district” insisted on the dismissal of an entire 
school board and the superintendent of the school system, although the board quickly 
rescinded an integration plan; and some outside developments such as Georgia 
Governor Talmadge’s public defiance of the ruling, the passing of segregation bills 
in the Louisiana General Assembly, and protests boycotting the schools in 
Washington D.C. following the decision. He also observed Cherry’s attendance at a 
conference in Virginia “on means of opposing the Supreme Court decision”, just a 
few days before he “urged the schools to wait, to postpone integration as 
‘premature’.” 206  Meanwhile he had already stated his “stand for local school 
determination, and the matter was largely considered to be settled.” 207  
In fact, Faubus had attempted to capitalize on the race issue by “deal[ing] 
with the matter of integration” at his official campaign opening, but as he recalled 
“the matter was [not]mentioned again during the campaign.”208 Besides he backed 
off when the Arkansas Gazette “scolded him for an early pronouncement” of the 
issue.209 As Reed noted, Faubus, “well ahead of other public figures, had spotted the 
explosive potential” of the issue, which was not yet ripe, but which he thought early 
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in 1954 “would elect a governor of Arkansas.”210 However, the moderate Arkansas 
was not anticipating an immediate threat in the decision, which was not surprising. 
Reed pointed out that, by 1950, after years of black flight to the North, Arkansas 
found it “easy to be a little high-minded on the issue… [with] only six counties with 
black majorities,” most of it concentrated on the low country Mississippi delta.211 
However, as Faubus observed, this was mostly because people assumed they would 
have the last word in what they perceived as a long-term process, and also because 
they were more interested in the more urgent and short-term economic issues of high 
utility costs or taxes. Thus, in line with the most obvious public demand, Cherry’s 
campaign began capitalizing on Faubus’ McMath connections, saying also that “the 
old political highway commissioners were trying to regain control by putting their 
friend Faubus into the governor’s office,” which was mostly the case.212 Meanwhile 
Faubus’ campaign was revolving around the corresponding issues such as welfare, 
100 percent assessment, utility rates, and the feed, seed, and fertilizer tax. 213 
However, in the runoff, the Cherry camp brought up the Commonwealth issue, which 
suddenly occupied the top place in the agenda.  
Actually, Cherry was hesitant to make it an issue, when John F. Wells, the 
former editor and reporter of the Arkansas Gazette, brought it before him, very early 
in the race. Wells obviously had a keen interest in the issue of communism, as he had 
helped Hays, during his 1942 campaign for Congress, to overcome charges of 
attendance in the communist tainted SCHW meeting. He was, however, a 
conservative, who could tolerate Hays’ moderacy, but strongly disapproved of the 
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McMath administration for its support for Truman. Still, his worst enemy was 
Ashmore, for his “covert espousal of the recommendations of President Truman’s 
Committee on Civil Rights,” which was according to Wells, “in reality an agency for 
the promotion of racial integration and discord…”214 In the description of Little Rock 
native Wells, Ashmore was an outside agitator,  
a native South Carolinian who had studied at Harvard University on a 
Nieman (tax-exempt foundation) fellowship, moved to the Arkansas 
scene from North Carolina and plunged into the mire of Arkansas 
politics in 1948, ….wrote, spoke and acted more to impress the Liberals 
dispensing tax-exempt foundation money…..and transformed the 
Arkansas Gazette from an outstanding news medium to a propaganda 
dispenser… 215  
 
Wells’ first reaction to Brown had been to cry out for a new party to rise “to carry out 
the burden of disciplined self government that both Democrats and Republicans have 
cast off in bidding votes of organized minorities. Its time the majority organized.”216 
The figure he felt the most disdain was Ashmore, who was increasingly coming 
forward in state politics, as a central figure among this “organized minority.”  
In 1954, when he came before Cherry with the Commonwealth suggestion, 
Wells was editing and publishing the conservative weekly The Arkansas Recorder, 
and was already chipping away communist charges against Ashmore. Ashmore had 
just published the findings of what he called the “Ashmore Project,” funded and 
directly administered by the Ford Foundation and aimed to inspect into the dual 
education system in the South - The book was published under the title “The Negro 
and the Schools” just before the Brown decision, and found its place among the 
sources that the Court made use of. 217 Ashmore’s integrationist status was also made 
clear, when he joined the founding board of Arkansas Council on Human Relations, 
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set up by the interracial organization to Southern Regional Council, specifically 
aimed at helping the implementation of the Brown decision. As a board member of 
the SRC, he also had helped the NAACP’s Arkansas chapter secure a large grant 
from the Ford Foudation’s Fund for the Republic, by establishing a “good working 
relationship” with its president Mrs. Daisy Bates. As Jacoway noted, by joining the 
national board of “the aggressive and well endowed Fund for the Republic” and by 
affiliating himself with it when it became an ardent supporter of civil rights in the 
South, “Ashmore placed himself in the line of fire of people such as John Wells, who 
felt certain that Ashmore was the agent of a vast communist conspiracy to undermine 
southern institutions, especially segregation.”218  
Wells’s reaction was very similar to the ardent segregationist and anti-
communist Eastland of Missisippi, calling for people to organize before the statewide 
convention of the Association of the Citizens’ Councils of Mississippi, held in 1955. 
Speaking of the same minority organization, Eastland claimed that such tax-exempt 
organizations with origins outside the south “[ran] from the blood red of the 
Communist Party to the almost equally Red of the National Churches of Christ in the 
U.S.A.”219 Specifically attacking the Ford Foundation (from where Ashmore got the 
most of its support) as the largest and most generous of these, he noted the vast sums 
of money flowing from its Fund for the Republic into such groups as the SRC, The 
National Council of Churches of Christ, and the NAACP for destroying the white 
South.220 After listing some others, he warned that “these and other anti-segregation 
organizations control news services, the magazines, the radio and television 
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chains…[attempting] to mould public opinion to accept full social equality and 
amalgamation.”221  
Wells clearly had in mind the same connections, when he decided to disclose 
Faubus, seeing another communist leaning McMath follower in Arkansas politics. 
He thought that the Court deliberately delayed the second ruling, until “it and the tax-
exempt foundations with which it was collaborating believed the time was 
propitious.”222 Writing just after Faubus took office in The Recorder, he would also 
elaborate on what he saw was among the “post-1954 steps” taken towards this end. 
With “Orval Faubus in the governor’s office and Harry Ashmore running the 
Arkansas Gazette,” a Little Rock Chapter of the Religion and Labor Foundation was 
formed, whose background “few of those enticed into…were aware.” 223  Seeing 
Ashmore and Faubus in the center of racial discord, he would continue feeding the 
public against both, even after Faubus took side with segregationists – thinking that 
he was insincere and a mere political opportunist, who created a crisis that only 
benefited personally to himself, Ashmore, and Mrs. Daisy Bates.224 Wells was an 
extreme example in Arkansas, who came closest to the Deep South rhetoric before 
the controversies surrounding desegregation. Indeed, the part of his Commonwealth 
findings pertaining to a red and black alliance, would still be downplayed during the 
1954 campaign. Focusing rather on Faubus’s denial and lying, anti-Faubus ads would 
even hesitate to directly label him a communist or subversive.  
In the primary Faubus was doing very well, with welfare as his most effective 
issue reaching out to the poor rural whites whom Cherry greatly offended. Cherry 
had also antagonized many prominent political figures, with his straightforward 
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attitude refusing to play the game. As Reed described Cherry, he was a “man of so 
little tolerance for the shadowy artistry….[and]ordinary niceties of politics,” and by 
1954 “political kingpins all over Arkansas….were ready to jump to someone else” 
because of the disinterest on part of Cherry to meet their demands. His campaign was 
not aggressive and was bad politics, as he was “confident that virtue would reward 
him and that the voters would understand the logic of what he had been doing as 
governor.”225 Along with the rural vote, Faubus carried the domain of these political 
bosses and the domain of the poultry industry leaders who were already infuriated by 
the only real disadvantage Cherry had – his veto of a bill to repeal the sales tax on 
feed, seed, and fertilizer.226 Still, if it was not for a last minute public speech that 
Ashmore wrote for Faubus, the Commonwealth issue was highly likely to carry the 
election in Cherry’s favor, despite the fact that Cherry was proving a terrible 
campaigner. 
Although Faubus’s success was evidenced in the primary, the Cherry staff 
decided that someone other than the governor himself should raise the anti-
communist charges, if it would be raised. It would indeed be Faubus who first 
publicly mentioned it and made it part of the campaign officially. Rumors of it were 
already circulating, and Faubus took defense when he realized, during his runoff 
campaign opening speech, that “Cherry workers were busily distributing literature 
among [his] listeners…[and that the issue] was being handled by the Cherry forces 
by word-of-mouth and the widespread circulation of the Wells newspaper and 
photostats of alleged documents show[ed his] presence at the college some 20 years 
before.”227 Warning the crowd about “the allegations of the whispering campaign,” 
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he immediately took to proving his loyalty to the country, which he did by talking 
about his “four years as a county official, service…in the Armed Forces of World 
War II including ten months of combat with the infantry, postmaster at Huntsville, 
membership in civic clubs, Lone Scouts of America, the Baptist Church, the Masonic 
Order, and the American Legion.” At the next stop of his speech, reporters were 
curious and now that he mentioned it, they expected a public statement about the 
charges. What Faubus told them was complete denial – he simply wrote a note on a 
piece of paper saying “I was never a student or faculty member at Commonwealth 
College.”228  
Two days later, after several ads entitled “Who is this man Faubus?” and 
headlines in The Recorder, Cherry went on television over a Little Rock station. As 
Faubus described, Cherry “was a lawyer and an effective speaker. His speech was 
like presenting one side of a lawsuit in a courtroom. He did this job well using 
photostats of news stories and headlines dating back to 1935.” 229 That same evening, 
Faubus called a lawyer friend and hurriedly took over the phone the dictation of a 
telegram, which basically threatened Cherry, Wells and Boyd Tackett (the other top 
advisor to Cherry) by suing them if they ever called him a subversive. He read the 
confident telegram in another speech he made the same evening in Little Rock. 
However, as he entered the Marion Hotel lobby that night he observed that “those 
present averted their eyes or turned away.” 230  
Ashmore knew that Cherry was considering raising the issue and was ready 
to editorialize against Cherry if that happened. 231 He knew that his longtime enemy 
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Wells was behind it and he greatly disapproved of McCarty-like tactics, and he 
decided to help Faubus in disposing of the issue. He wrote a speech for Faubus to 
read in an open air meeting, scheduled to be on the entire radio network, on the 
fourth day into the campaign. Ashmore remembered upon speaking to Faubus that  
he was desperate, and he was in an absolute funk…he just fell apart. He 
didn’t know what the hell to do about this. He had already made this 
stupid press conference statement where he denied it all... It took some 
pretty fancy footwork [to bring together a coherent story].232  
 
After Faubus’s denial, both Faubus and the campaign staff had already come forward 
with conflicting statements about the time he spent in the college and why he left it. 
Indeed, Ashmore considered the reason that Faubus stated for his leaving “the 
biggest lie he told…[which was]he left because they were practicing free love and 
that deeply offended him.”233 Ashmore’s text presented the story as “a poor boy 
down from the mountains trying to get an education [who] realizes he’s gotten in the 
wrong place and left,” and focused more on “ condemning unequivocally and harshly 
the smear tactics that were used”234 It worked, and as Faubus also stated, the speech 
was a turning point, and perhaps what saved him from losing even at this very late 
stage in the campaign.  
The surfacing of Faubus’s brief attendance in the college had important 
implications. The episode revealed the complexities involved in the relationship 
between the segregationist sentiment and anti-communism, with Arkansas as an 
Upper South state as the locale. In the Deep South, the support for resistance was 
immediate and solid, and its anti-communist rhetoric highly effective; because the 
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public was much more receptive to the combination of red and race baiting, and the 
conspiratorial thinking it included. In Arkansas, however, both segregation and 
communism were not normally issues to be urgently discussed, and were not as 
quickly brought together as it was in the Deep South, at least not before the Little 
Rock crisis carried the emotions to its height. This tendency of not falling into the 
Deep South kind of conspiratorial thinking was in parallel to the relative ease 
brought by much fewer occurrences of racial antagonism.  
Moreover, in Arkansas, as it was with the rest of the Upper South, anti-
communist measures had been an integral part of its history, most prominent of 
which was the 1935 investigation into the Commonwealth. Thus it was mostly 
settled, without any need to elaborate too much on a black and red conspiracy. 
Besides, McCarthyism was more easily denounced in Arkansas. As Reed pointed 
out, even some conservatives in the state would be disdainful of Cherry’s campaign, 
and the same week that Commonwealth began to appear in newspapers as an issue of 
the gubernatorial race, on the headlines was also news of the debate in the Senate 
over whether to censure the Senator.235 However, as Ashmore recalled, “everybody, 
including Orval, thought he was beaten” during the controversial runoff. As Reed 
pointed out and Ashmore agreed, for the common Arkansan in 1954 “McCarthysm 
was [still] riding high, meaning most Americans thought Joe McCarthy was probably 
right. Only people like you [Ashmore] and Ed Dunaway and people who are now 
considered sensible were offended by McCarthyism.”236 As it turned out, what saved 
Faubus was the fact that the character of the campaign was rid of communism itself, 
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mostly by the Ashmore speech, focusing instead on “dirty pool, last-minute trickery 
[of Cherry].”237 Ashmore defined the tone of the moment saying  
regardless of what the charges—if there had been a foot massage—I 
think there would have been some of the same kind of reaction. Orval 
was running with the [campaign as an] underdog anyway...The chief 
critic of Joe McCarthy was Bill Fulbright…I think there was a reaction 
against McCarthy as a bully boy. Ideologically, it probably didn’t make a 
whole lot of difference, but I don’t know how much I can appraise 
that.238  
 
Thus the Faubus victory did not really prove that anti-communist charges would not 
hold. Apart from political leadership, anti-communist sentiment was still alive in the 
community and alone, it could have lost him the election if it was not for the way 
Cherry, who had already antagonized his constituency, mis-handled the issue; and for 
the effective Faubus campaign helped by Ashmore. Still, it was obvious that no 
charges of racial liberalism were directed at Faubus along with the Commonwealth 
charge. Unlike the Deep South, Arkansas did not necessarily attach communism with 
the segregationist sentiment, at least not as immediately. Both anti-communist and 
segregationist sentiment readily waited however for the next election, to become 
more visible, as soon as racial feelings were aroused. 
 
3.3 1956 Gubernatorial – Race Politics 
After the eventful runoff, Faubus surrounded himself with “businessmen, 
planters, hungry lawyers, and political operatives.” One of the most influential 
among them was, Stephen Witts who shared a lot with Faubus despite their “finances 
and economic philosophies,” and despite his being a Cherry supporter before the 
Faubus victory.239 In Reed’s description,  
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Both came from farms and knew hard physical work as youngsters. They 
feared failure…They were proud. They distrusted city people and took 
satisfaction from besting them. Each rose to top, but neither was 
accepted by the elite of the state. They represented the populist ideal in 
all its yearnings, rewards, and disappointments.240 
 
This aspect of Faubus was of considerable importance in understanding his 
insecurity, his obstinate passion for holding his political office, and also why his 
“moderacy” was much more inclined to change in line with his own political 
interests, compared to others like Hays. A similar observation about the Faubus 
character was also made by Ashmore, early in the times when he was with the 
McMath staff. In one confession Ashmore said:  
I don’t think I’ve ever done entire justice in writing about Orval or in 
writing about the whole period, [is] the class aspect of this and the 
resentment against Ed Dunaway and me and the town of Little Rock and 
the fact that Orval was an outsider…he[Faubus] had been around the 
state house, and he knew that a lot of people didn’t take him very 
seriously, including me. I didn’t take him very seriously.241  
 
To make up for this injustice, Ashmore went on to explain the circumstances 
in which Faubus finally got rid of the Depression hit poverty of his youth and 
became the governor: 
…another big factor in this[Faubus’s insecurity and political 
opportunism] is that Orval came back from the war, where he had a 
pretty good record. He was a captain and got some kind of medal, I 
guess. Orval—that was a pretty high cotton experience for him, and he 
had been a man of some substance, an officer, gentleman, and whatever. 
He comes back up there to the country and runs a piss-ass newspaper and 
barely makes a living, and then being postmaster or whatever. It’s [a] 
pretty miserable existence for him when he plunged back into that. Then 
Sid brings him down, …and he [comes] down to Little Rock. Then he 
finally gets into politics.242  
 
Faubus simply did not have a career to get back to if he got out of state politics, and 
had “no skills” unlike most governors who were “a lawyer or something.”243 Signs of 
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such insecurity of a man of the hills and disdain towards the city elite, were evident 
in Faubus’s own frequent remarks in his autobiography. Where he talked about the 
first time he announced his official campaign opening, he paid special attention to 
mentioning the “$10 per plate breakfast held…to raise funds for the Cherry 
campaign…[where]many of them[state employees] with members of their families 
were in attendance,” and also the “the novel way of advertising the candidacy of Guy 
‘Mutt’ Jones” in which balloons went up in four of the states’ major cities including 
Little Rock. He wrote that such occurrences were about the same time that he 
announced his own opening but the news of it was carried on page 2 of a newspaper, 
under a Cherry story headline. Although he entered the race at the very last moment, 
he perceived this as “a strong indication that the editors didn’t consider my 
candidacy of sufficient importance to warrant a separate story.”244 Once making it to 
the governor’s office, the ultimate chance to make himself accepted in high circles, 
he would do whatever it took to keep it. 
When he took office in 1955, Faubus had to deal with both a legislature of the 
General Assembly consisting of Cherry supporters and with the resentment of 
particularly the Little Rock elite. He also had to reinforce the difficult alliance that 
was forming – the conservative element of business interests gathering around him 
and whose support he needed, and the liberal element his own constituency - the 
rural and labor vote that was highly sensitive to tax increases. More focused on that, 
he did not yet mention integration, after he had backed off in the beginning of the 
previous elections in 1954.  
After fulfilling some campaign promises by repealing two laws – the seed 
and feed tax, and the law that required people to seek help from relatives before 
                                               
244
 Faubus, Down from the Hills, 21. 
  95
being eligible for welfare – he followed hands off policy towards the legislature.245 
He also worked on overcoming the resentment of the city elite. One of the first 
meetings he attended after assuming his office was with a group of Little Rock 
businessmen and county clubbers, whom Reed called “the capital’s best” and who 
threw him endless questions about his ideas of communism or if his liberalism would 
hurt them. Meanwhile Wells continued to publish news in The Recorder, accusing 
Faubus of lying about his Commonwealth experience in the loyalty oath he signed to 
become an army officer in 1942. Faubus was then interviewed by a general who had 
been investigating the issue, and was cleared. 246  
Meanwhile however, he had pushed through the legislature the politically 
risky reform in the county property-tax system to equalize the taxes, which looked 
good on paper but in practice created and unfavorable reaction, as it also burdened 
some districts with heavier taxes.247 Moreover, as Reed pointed out, he went on 
“sending gestures of friendship to the black community of Arkansas,” such as 
opening the state Democratic Party to black participation, equalizing salaries of black 
and white employees, not voicing concern over desegregation taking place in five 
districts and giving Mrs. Daisy Bates an Arkansas Traveler certificate. 248  All 
contributed to hurt his administration further. 
Thus, as he was preparing to ask for a second term in 1956 he realized that he 
needed to capitalize on the integration issue this time, which he knew was the only 
issue that would emotionally outweigh the obsession with the taxes and fix his liberal 
record. Although he observed a sentiment was already building up, he was still 
continuing the hands off policy and waiting, until state senator James D. Johnson 
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announced his candidacy. Meanwhile he was carefully observing the mostly 
unrecognized and downplayed difficulties the state was having in implementing 
desegregation. 
After the first Brown decision, as John A. Kirk noted, the regional differences 
were already revealing the difficulty of implementation. Following the first incident 
in Sheridan, which urged both Faubus and Cherry refrain from concrete statements 
back in 1954, the General Assembly meeting in January 1955 further evidenced “the 
politically ambiguous role of the desegregation issue.”249  Two eastern Arkansas 
senators, introduced a pupil assignment bill aimed at circumventing the Brown 
decision geographically without mentioning the issue of race. The main opponent 
was Senator Max Howell, who had the white suburbs of Little Rock among his 
constituency, and he could only win a delay in its implementation until the Court 
issued a statement on the implementation of the first decision.  
In the delicate balance, the importance of Little Rock came from its having 
the largest school system in the state and its geographical location between eastern 
and northwestern regions. Whatever course taken there would prevent the eastern 
section from further trying to prevent implementation. Virgil Blossom, The 
Superintendent of Schools had declared four days after first ruling that the school 
board would not immediately begin and instead devise plans until the second ruling. 
Only with NAACP’s pressure he announced a plan to build two new schools first – 
one in the predominantly black eastern part of the city, Horace Mann High, and one 
in the white suburbs of the western part, Hall High – and then to open all three 
(including Central High) in 1957 on a desegregated basis. However, right after the 
second ruling came, Blossom devised his plan to minimize the impact of 
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desegregation further, by allowing whites to transfer out of Horace Mann. Other 
three school districts followed suit and drew up plans delaying any action until Little 
Rock made the first move.250  
Both the absence of strong defiance – which was mostly owing to the absence 
of outright measures toward immediate implementation – and Faubus’ early 
moderate announcement about the importance of relying on the goodwill between the 
people of both races, convinced many that Arkansas would go on serving as a model 
for the rest of the South.251 Ashmore did not even feel that he should lobby for the 
governor.252 However, signs of white resistance began to upset the balance before 
moderacy could afford real positive change. Just a month after Brown II, the very 
positive development in Hoxie, a rural trading centre in the northeastern region, 
became the event through which the white resistance made its appearance in the 
State.  
In June, the Hoxie school board voted to stop the very expensive practice of 
busing its very few black children and instead integrate them into formerly all-white 
schools.253 However, Chris Merger, a black attorney who went to the district as part 
of the Arkansas Council on Human Relations, stated that “the White Citizens 
Council and other segregationist groups were just rantin’ and pantin’ about and 
picketing and zeroing in on that community…there was so much outside 
pressure…working up the frenzy of people…” Therefore he found a white lawyer 
“whom [he]thought might be sympathetic” to represent the board and they filed a 
petition in federal district court, which eventually prevented the demonstrations and 
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integrated the Hoxie schools.254 However, the board had to close the schools two 
weeks before the normal end of semester to “provide a cooling off period.”255  
The groups Merger described as outsiders were, the White Citizens’ Councils 
of Arkansas founded by Senator James D. Johnson, White America Inc. founded by a 
railroad official L. D. Poynter, and the Citizens Committee Representing Segregation 
headed by a local soy-bean farmer and auctioneer Herbert Brewer.256 However, a 
corresponding description of outside agitators was also found in the September 1955 
issue of the Recorder. The John Wells publication firstly criticized “the daily 
newspapers in this area, especially the Arkansas Gazette which sent its Southern 
School News correspondent to Hoxie, [for]attempting to create the impression that 
all would have been well at Hoxie except for interference from the ‘outside,’ 
meaning White America, Inc.” Then the article listed the “real” outsiders without 
which, it asserted, there would be no White America, Inc.: 
1. The U. S. Supreme Court, by promulgation of an opinion in May, 
1954….2. The National Association for the Advancement of the Colored 
People....by assigning to Arkansas many months ago a field 
worker….whose mission has been to encourage Negroes to demand 
integration at once….3. The Ford Foundation, through its Soutehrn 
Education Reporting Service , which has constantly dinned into school 
boards and administrators (they are on the mailing list of Southern 
School News)….that it is futile to resist…[which] is the brainwashing 
technique, financed with tax-exempt foundation funds…4. The Arkansas 
Council on Human Relations…a bi-racial outfit financed with Fund for 
the Republic tax-exempt money…[dispatching] its executive secretary to 
Hoxie…Life Magazine, which arranged for the kind of pictures it wanted 
, to implant in the public mind a distorted conception of what was 
involved in Hoxie, where only 21 Negro children were to be assigned to 
white schools attended by about 1,000 pupils…6. Daily newspapers, 
notably the Gazette and Memphis Commercial Appeal….by overplaying 
the Hoxie story, and in consequence inciting stern opposition…257 
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Thus the event was still open to interpretation and rather than being a positive step 
toward peaceful integration, it had many things to offer in the opposite direction. 
Apart from the controversy surrounding who the real agitator was, there was the fact 
that forces of Massive Resistance found an event to capitalize on and stir the racial 
feeling in the community. Indeed, it was owing to the Hoxie episode that the 
segregationist Senator Johnson, found the opportunity to be heard all over the state 
and eventually run against Faubus in 1956. The Recorder article got it mostly right 
when it mentioned Life magazine’s impact. As also noted by Kirk, all the 
segregationists groups appeared in Hoxie right after the Life magazine article entitled 
“A ‘Morally Right’ Decision” also enclosed photographs of white and black kids 
attending classes and playing together made it into nationwide news.258 This extent 
of publicity would also draw the attention of the organizers of the Massive 
Resistance movement. 
By the time the election was on the way, Johnson had garnered forces 
statewide, also with enormous support from the Deep South organization, which 
poured into Arkansas following the Hoxie incident. The summer of 1955 was also 
the year that Citizens Councils were speedily spreading across the South, from 
Mississippi, just across the river from Johnson’s home. Johnson also found the White 
Citizens’ Council of Arkansas that summer and began publishing the Arkansas Faith 
its official media, both propagandizing for his planned candidacy in the 1956 race for 
governor.  
The setting in Hoxie that Johnson found himself in, when he went there to 
join the other segregationist organizations, further infuriated him. Meeting in 
Brewer’s house with the local council organization, he learned of the unpleasant 
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presence of the FBI agents in town. The FBI had been authorized with full 
investigation and sent into the area, when the school board sought assistance from 
the justice department after they were presented a petition that included 1,100 
signatures protesting its action, but the agents. The agents visited every house with 
the photocopies of the petition and caused both panic in the community and caused, 
as Jacoway noted, Johnson’s “all paranoid tendencies come to fore.” After the 
episode he traveled to Virginia and South Carolina to gather information on the 
“emerging doctrines of the massive resistance” and came back with the proposal of 
an amendment to the Arkansas Constitution, which mainly talked about the doctrine 
of interposition.259  
Meanwhile the in winter of 1955 Senator Eastland of Mississippi gave one of 
his key speeches of the Resistance Movement in the statewide convention of the 
Mississippi Citizens Council. In December, his speech entitled “We Have Reached 
an Era of Judicial Tyranny” noted the situation in Hoxie as the first evidence of such 
tendency. Noting about the FBI presence in Mississippi in an “attempt to bluff and 
intimidate Southern people, ” he went on warning that it was not unnatural for the 
agency to investigate crime but “the political investigations such as occurred in 
Homes County and in Arkansas are another matter. They went to Hoxie, Arkansas 
and attempted to intimidate the people to agree to an interracial school.”260 Like 
Wells, he further elaborated on the “vast sums of money, much of it tax-
exempt..[that] are being thrown into a vast program of propaganda and outright 
falsehoods to misrepresent Southern views and conditions in the South.” He further 
detailed his argument by saying: 
                                               
259
 Jacoway, 35-36. 
260
 James O. Eastland, Address before the statewide convention of the Citizens’ Councils of 
Mississippi, entitled “We have Reached an Era of Judicial Tyranny.” Citizens’ Councils of America 
Literature, 1947-1969, Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville, Arkansas, 
Series V. Items 1-15, Acc.No.66, Loc.146, 8. 
  101 
Millions of fair-minded Americans in other regions denied access to the 
truth, are being hoodwinked, misled, and deceived by this cunning 
campaign. In its essence it is an attack upon the American system of 
government. The Negro is being used as a pawn by those who plot the 
destruction of our Government. The Communist conspiracy can never 
succeed in America unless there is first destroyed the powers of the 
States. It can never succeed until the people are deprived of the power to 
control their local institutions.261 
 
 
After stating the importance of local governance he talked about the very pleasant 
way that the state of Virginia had been dealing with the issue. He then began his 
critique of the Arkansas failure to take such a stand, and he directly singled out 
Faubus, saying: 
One high official of the State government [Faubus] is quoted in the 
public press as stating that it is a matter for each school district to decide, 
and that each school district can formulate its own policies and conduct 
its own defense. There are instances of integrated schools in Arkansas. 
These instances have occurred against the will of the great majority of 
the people.262  
Condemning the “instances of integrated schools in Arkansas” which were the Hoxie 
incident and the preceding Sheridan, the even earlier one in Fayetteville in which the 
University of Arkansas had admitted black students and a few others, Eastland, 
blamed it on the lack of a viable state policy. Thus, as well as reaching out to the 
public and warning them of the dangerous communist conspiracy inherent in the 
desegregation decisions, he also addressed the political authority of the moderately 
inclined states such as Arkansas. Such call for action to state governors, within the 
context of anti-communism, must have compelled the Arkansas governor to take a 
stance, especially if his vulnerability to communist conspiracies is considered. 
Indeed, about one month later he would take his first step towards the segregationist 
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side by sending the Bird Committee of Arkansas to Virginia to study the integration 
situation.263 
It is within this context that Johnson traveled to Mississippi and after getting 
the Eastland’s comments, he put his amendment into final form. Returning to 
Arkansas he went to Faubus and publicly requested he call for a special session of 
the legislature to reconsider the bill that had failed in the regular session of 1955. 
Faubus thought that “many prominent people, including most political leaders, did 
not yet realize what was happening or the intensity of the feeling of the people on 
this emotional issue,” and what Johnson did by calling for this special session was 
“to put [him] on the spot and place [him] in disfavor with the great majority of the 
people...” 264  Early in February 1956, Johnson went on to advertise his bill and 
organized a segregationist rally in England, with such speakers as former Governor 
Ben Laney, Massive Resistance leaders Roy V. Harris of Georgia and Robert B. 
Patterson of Mississippi, and Attorney Amis Guthridge who was by then the head of 
the Capital Citizens Council, Little Rock chapter of the Citizens’ Councils of 
Arkansas. 265  To this background, Johnson went on to advertise his proposed 
legislation. Beginning in the fall of 1955, the recurring themes that appeared in his 
widely and freely distributed campaign publication, Arkansas Faith, were the 
following: 
the illegalities of the Brown decision; the threat of communism; the 
dangers presented by the left-wing Arkansas Gazette and especially the 
“pinko,” foundation-funded Harry Ashmore; the horrors of 
miscegenation; demonstrated by photographs of black men dating and 
kissing white women, the inadequacies of Orval Faubus (Awful 
Fabalouse)..., the glories of interposition, and the ultimate salvation of 
the Johnson Amendment.266 
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The arrival of such Deep South rhetoric in the state, and the fact that it was the only 
audible position on the desegregation issue, had great importance in shaping the 
course of events during the Little Rock crisis. 
Arkansas events would also echo in the Massive Resistance propaganda 
which increasingly gained nationwide appeal. In 1956, Georgia Congressman James 
C. Davis would use Arkansas Congressman Ezekiel C. Gathings’ speech in which 
he defended in Congress numbers and statistics showing the communist affiliations 
of the civil rights organizations. Gathings had its constituency in the eastern 
Arkansas region. The Atlanta Congressman used Gathings’ survey results, in a TV 
and radio program, to argue his point against Republican Congressman Kenneth 
Keating of New York. 267  In response to Keating’s defense of the federal 
government’s goodwill and moral impetus in helping the civil rights struggle, Davis 
said: 
…I don’t think that the better classes of the colored people are pushing 
for these so-called civil rights…this agitation is being done by the radical 
organization the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People. Now, Congressman Gathings of Arkansas on February 23rd put 
the record on the Congressional Record…[that] the executive secretary 
of that organization has been listed six times by the House Committee on 
Un-American Activities as having participated in Communist front 
activities, that the Chairman of the Board of Directors has been listed as 
participating in three Communist fronts…[list goes on]; that in 1954 the 
total officers and directors were 193 and of that number 89 or 46.1 
percent had been listed in the files of [H.U.A.C.] as having participated 
in Communist front organizations.268  
 
 In response, Keating didn’t even question his claims but just tried to point out to the 
other side of the issue – that the Russians were using this as a propaganda tool and 
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overseas “the black and yellow races yearn for brotherhood.”269 Like earlier response 
of Herman Talmadge of Georgia, Davis responded by dismissing such concern. He 
said: “Well, when America formulated its own foreign policy, and made its own 
plans, we fared much better in world opinion than we have done since we began 
trying to checkmate Russian propaganda…It’s not worth a nickel to try to please 
Russia.”270  Such rhetoric was a best example of coming together such Southern 
regionalist notions as unilateralism in foreign affairs, rejection of centralized power, 
anti-communism, conspiratorial thinking, and racism. Such vocal and confident 
remarks from the Deep South, would also contribute to the mounting pressure on the 
still passively waiting Faubus. 
The impact of such intimidation by the resistance forces, both in and out of 
state, showed in Faubus’ actions even before Johnson announced his candidacy. In 
early March, one key development was the arrival of the Southern Manifesto before 
the Arkansas Congressional delegation. After several members signed it, including 
Fulbright who had heard that Laney might oppose his bid for re-election, Faubus 
lobbied and convinced the two others, Hays and Jim Trimble (whom he visited in an 
hospital where he was confined to his bed) to sign.271  About ten days later, he 
announced his sponsorship of the two measures that the Bird Committee had 
recommended on their return from Virginia – the pupil assignment bill which he 
described as “an initiated act to grant to the schools boards...full power and authority 
over the assignment of students for attendance to the various school facilities,” but 
which was so open ended as to allow no integration; and the Massive Resistance 
weapon, a resolution of interposition which was basically a reduced version of 
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Johnson’s amendment. 272  One month later Johnson announced his candidacy, at 
another segregation rally, with Griffin as the featured speaker. The Arkansas Gazette 
defined the gathering as being “the largest at any segregation rally in Arkansas. The 
previous record was about 1,400 at a rally at England February 24.”273 And in early 
July, Faubus opened his campaign for re-election by declaring that “his record was 
trustworthy” unlike his opponents claim, and as a news article reported “his best 
round of applause came when he said no school district would be forced to integrate 
against its will while he was governor.”274 This was the statement that won Faubus 
his second term. 
Meanwhile Ashmore was back in Arkansas after his service to Adlai 
Stevenson in the 1956 Democratic Convention, and resumed his mission with the 
Arkansas Gazette. Missing many of the events of the year and the tone of the 
campaign, he immediately began editorializing against the Johnson Amendment 
(which Johnson kept alive even after his failure to get elected) in a way that Jacoway 
considered, “may even contributed to the ultimate success of the amendment, 
especially among many people who believed Ashmore and the Gazette were agents 
of the left-wing conspiracy.”275 Faubus observed, it passed the House but “pigeon-
holed in the Senate,” when “many of the senators didn’t want to risk inflaming the 
issue of race at the time.”276 However, after Faubus endorsed as governor four of the 
bills that had passed the House, the Senate amended two of them in the General 
Assembly that came into session in the winter of 1957.277 Along with the one that 
provided legal assistance for any school board that opted for segregation, the other 
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important result of the amendment was to allow a State Sovereignty Commission 
which would act just as the anti-subversive bodies in the Deep South. As Faubus 
would tell Jacoway in an interview, what he did was to avoid “the detriment of being 
classified as an extreme liberal in order to survive in Arkansas politics.”278 
The Capital Citizens Council chaired by Amis Guthridge would take on the 
mission of pressuring Faubus, as the fall semester integration at Central High drew 
near. After the open letter that they publicized and sent to Faubus calling him to 
“exercise his police powers”, the second most important intimidation was the 
gathering that took place on Johnson’s request from Griffin and Harris of Georgia.279 
On August 22, 1957 both leaders of the Massive Resistance spoke at a $10 per plate 
dinner in Little Rock to raise funds to stop integration – the Georgia governor 
exclaimed before some 350 people that he would never permit the schools of his 
state to integrate and Harris added that Griffin “would use the National Guard, the 
state patrol, and every able-bodied man in Georgia to keep the Negroes out.” 280 As 
Hays pointed out, there was already a pressure on Faubus from the east Arkansas 
political figures, where race was more of a problem compared to the rest of the state, 
and this visit “greatly encouraged local extremists and exacerbated the problem 
considerably from the standpoint of spreading fear of violence,”281 However one 
other factor was to urge Faubus in his stand against the federal government. As 
Ashmore commented: 
Well, Brooks said...that all he was trying to do was to keep Orval from 
being pushed into the hands of the adamant people of the Citizens’ 
Council, into the adamant company of the resistant Southern governors. 
Well, the son of a bitch was already there, and that was what the problem 
was. It wasn’t a matter of pushing. Marvin Griffin and these folks had 
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sold him this interposition package, and so once he had gotten in there, 
there was really no way he could get out of it.282 
 
Indeed Faubus had hosted Griffin and Harris in the Governor’s Mansion for an 
overnight stay right before the event. Regardless of the nature of the matters they 
discussed in the meeting, it was a clear sign that they were welcome in Arkansas. As 
Harris later recalled, they “had to apologize to the Council folks for staying 
there...[by saying that] having us two there at the Mansion’s the worst thing could 
happen to Faubus. It’ll ruin him with the integrationists and liberals.”283 One week 
later Faubus would appear before Justice Murray Reed of the state court, as a witness 
to the Mothers of Central High League that was seeking temporary injunction against 
school integration with charges that integration would lead to violence – an 
injunction that Murray would grant, but federal judge Ronald N. Davies would 
nullify on August 30. Despite the nullification, Faubus would order the National 
Guard to surround the school on September 2. After that Faubus received a massive 
amount of letters and telegrams celebrating his stand, which further urged him to 
take on the Massive Resistance rhetoric that increasingly downplayed the issue of 
race and elevated concerns about invasion of states’ rights and anti-communism.  
In a telegram to President Eisenhower, he explained that “the question at 
issue in Little Rock this moment is not integration vs. segregation.... [but rather, 
whether] or not the head of a sovereign state can exercise his constitutional powers 
and discretion in maintaining peace and good order within his jurisdiction, being 
accountable to his own conscience and to his own people.”284 Insisting that he placed 
the National Guard to “preserve the peace and good order of this community” he 
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added that he received “reliable information” as to the plans of the Federal 
Authorities in Little Rock to unconstitutionally “take into custody, the head of a 
sovereign state.” He later complained that he had “reasons to believe that the 
telephone lines to the Arkansas Executive Mansion have been tapped – I suspect the 
Federal Agents.” In line with Eastland’s warning after the events in Hoxie, he noted 
that “the situation is further aggravated by the impending unwarranted interference of 
federal agents.” Then an intimidating tone: “If these actions continue, or if my 
executive authority as Governor to maintain the peace is breached, then I can no 
longer be responsible for the results. The injury to persons and property that would 
be caused – the blood that may be shed will be on the hands of the federal 
government and its agents.”285  
However, regardless of the time that Faubus decided to focus on the issue of 
race or finally call out the National Guard to prevent the black students from entering 
Central High, it was obvious that he did it to cover up for his insecurities and prove 
to public that he was an eligible man to govern them in the way they wanted. He 
observed passively, during all the time he went on with his hands-off policy, the 
ongoing vocalization of racial sentiments on the grassroots level, brought by the 
forces of Massive Resistance. The rhetoric and methods proposed by the Massive 
Resistance (among which states’ rights was the most suitable for Faubus) and 
Johnson’s opposition that echoed extreme Massive Resistance rhetoric, enabled him 
to make it an issue easily – without necessarily putting forward an out rightly racist 
argument and alienating some “moderate” segments of his constituency. Along with 
Faubus’s, the inactivity and silence on part of other moderates contributed to this 
rise. And Faubus chose to go along with the visible public opinion rather than taking 
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the difficult task of reshaping it, let alone trying to prevent it from the start. Thus he 
secured a safe political ground for himself. His own insecurity, which was greatly 
swelled by a liberal record on race and a questionable record on communism, from 
the start, contributed to this political maneuver. 
 
  110 
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
 
The crystallization of a Massive Resistance movement in the South during the 
1950s and its culmination in a worldwide-acknowledged integration crisis revealed 
that the racial prejudices and anti-communist sentiment had been part of a Southern 
tradition extending well beyond the Cold War. However, American historiography 
has tended to ignore this very domestic context in its interpretation of the Little Rock 
integration crisis of 1957 in Arkansas. The most obvious reason for this failure was 
the fact that Little Rock crisis had been a primary interest for scholars of the civil 
rights movement as a turning point in the struggle for civil rights. Although the event 
proved to be a key development in terms of finally confirming the Federal 
Government’s open support for the cause, the background to the whole episode 
suggests a much broader understanding.  
In their specific treatment of the Little Rock crisis, such recent civil rights 
scholars as Brenda Gayle Plummer, Penny Von. Eschen, Mary L. Dudziak, or Azza 
Salama Layton, showed how the civil rights movement successfully and with great 
awareness and organization, benefited from the Cold War atmosphere, by revealing 
the racial injustice within its borders and finally urging the federal government to act 
to eliminate it. Though not incorrect, this analysis tends to ignore the corresponding 
  111 
usefulness of the Cold War atmosphere for the white resistance to civil rights. The 
white resistance in Little Rock had much to do with the culmination the Massive 
Resistance movement, making use of increased concerns of domestic anti-
communism during the height of the Cold War. More than anything else, it showed 
how the local regional feelings about race and subversion were fed to create a very 
insecure atmosphere for moderacy that existed in the Upper South, pushing it to a 
position of inactivity.  
As revealed by the developments that provided the background to the crisis, 
the grassroots organization in Arkansas, no matter how limited compared to the Deep 
South, played an important role in convincing Faubus that he could politically 
survive much more easily if he went along with forces of segregation. Little Rock 
crisis, which he certainly helped create by a hands-off attitude all along the building 
up of the segregationist sentiment, came as an opportunity for Faubus to secure his 
place in state politics. Moreover, the anti-communist rhetoric the resistance 
movement employed had an exceptional advantage for Faubus’ personal gain, 
substantiating his political image for the years to follow. Taking the strong stand that 
he finally did in Little Rock, by dispatching the National Guard to Central High in an 
attempt to prevent integration, was wholly motivated by aspirations of local politics. 
The event that scholars came to interpret largely in global terms had very local, and 
even personal resonations.  
What Little Rock also contributed was the gradual disappearance of the 
extremist rhetoric of Massive Resistance, renewing itself to further downplay the 
concerns about race, focusing rather on the unpleasant extent of centralization of 
government, and later, on the subversive nature of the civil rights movement. That 
would eventually bring great national appeal to the cause of the movement, 
  112 
especially during the next decade, when integration moved southward and signs of 
radicalism were perceived in the new generation of young civil rights protesters. 
Indeed Faubus received private letters of approval and support from both in and 
outside Arkansas during the course of events in Little Rock. In one such letter from 
Texas dated September 5, 1957, attorney Thomas W. Fulton remarked:  
I have read with deep concern the fears expressed by you in this 
morning’s press that agents of the federal government may be planning 
to arrest you for your constitutional stand in using the National Guard 
troops to prevent violence in your state which might arise out of the 
unconstitutional attempt of the federal government to force integration in 
your public school system…[if it happens and the federal government 
arrests the head of a sovereign state]then the constitutional rights of 
every citizen of this country have been done away with and we are now 
all under the rule of a dictatorship. 286 
 
His letter was also evidencing the increasing distrust of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation on part of the proponents of the Massive Resistance movement, which 
once made use of Hoover’s open support and later his private leaking of documents 
to southern leadership. Fulton, in the same letter that he also forwarded to Lyndon 
Johnson and J. Edgar Hoover, went on to comment of the presence of FBI in 
Arkansas, saying that “in the past ...[he]had the greatest respect for the head of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation due to the numerous ways in which he has in the past 
jealously safeguarded the constitutional rights of all citizens of this country...[but 
Hoover contributes to Faubus’ arrest]...then I feel that Mr. Hoover’s personal 
integrity is gone and that he is merely the head of an American ‘Gestapo’ agency.”287 
Another letter Faubus received two days later from a lawyer at Washington D.C., he 
complained about the insincerity of the Republican Party in pursuing black civil 
rights. The letter pointed to Eastland’s speech before the Senate a few years ago, “in 
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which speech that illustrious Senator exposed the Communist background of all the 
pseudo scientists in the sociological and psychological fields upon which the 
Supreme Court based its decision in total disregard of the long-established law of the 
land...”288 He also mentioned how the District Judge Robert N. Wilkins decided in 
favor of the Bar Association of the District of Columbia, in a case that he defended 
against the granting of membership to black attorneys. His account revealed the 
increasing tendency to relate desegregation and subversion, and increasing will to 
resist it in the community: 
…we have several social functions and dinners a year. We are opposed 
to any breakdown in the social barrier separating the races, and for that 
reason brought suit against the association last year when the Negro-
loving the president of our Association took a voice vote on a bylaw 
amendment to admit the Negro attorney to membership…Judge Wilkins 
heard the case and granted our injunction, throwing out the voice vote. A 
new vote by written and secret ballot has just been completed, and the 
membership has rejected the proposed amendment – thus keeping our 
Association 100% WHITE, except of course for the ‘White Niggers’ and 
Communists who may be among us.289  
 
Apart from the fear of subversive elements in their midst, people also voiced 
concerns about the dangers inherent in a possible change in the American form of 
government. Greene Chandler Furman, an attorney from the nation’s capital, 
perceived the use of federal troops in Little Rock to implement the desegregation 
decisions of the Court, which “largely depended upon modern psychological and 
sociological texts of a controversial nature...instead of the usual methods of legal and 
constitutional reasoning,” as “a strange and novel development of justice.”290 Furman 
sent this article to Faubus for corrections before publication, two weeks before 
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Eisenhower deployed the 101st Airborne Division to Little Rock and federalized the 
Arkansas National Guard. He concluded stating that “As we come to grips with the 
problem it is certain that our form of government must undergo a profound change. 
Let us hope it is for the better, but for better or worse we are on our way.”291  
During the course of the crisis, Faubus would embrace much of the anti-
communist rhetoric of the Massive Resistance. The rhetoric did not subside even 
after the Supreme Court re-affirmed the Brown decision in September, 1958, by 
judging in Cooper v. Aaron that, popular hostility to integration didn’t justify 
segregation. Indeed, Faubus grew more vociferous and bold, to maintain political 
support. As Bartley put it, by 1958 he “had developed a latent talent for 
demagoguery,” and by the time the state Democratic convention met in the summer 
of that year “he was arguing that school desegregation was a communist plot and that 
Little Rock school board should reimpose segregation, or resign and make way for a 
board with the backbone to do it.”292 In response to the presence of federal troops in 
his state, he compared the “occupation of Little Rock by federal troops to the 
German occupation of Paris and the Soviet attack on Budapest.”293 Drawing on the 
same comparison, Senator Talmadge also condemned the “the president of the 
United States…for [destroying] the sovereignty of the state of Arkansas…by using 
tanks and troops in the streets of Little Rock.”294 Moreover, late in that year a hearing 
before the Special Education Committee of the Arkansas Legislative Council, made 
clear the suspicions of communist influence. State Attorney General Bruce Bennett 
told the audience that the hearings would prove the “intensive communist conspiracy 
that climaxed in Little Rock … [and that had been in place from 1928 to 1958].” To 
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him, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, which had been 
heavily involved in the promotion of desegregation in the city, involved many 
officials with “an almost incredible tie-in with Communists and Communist front 
organizations.”295  
The search for communist-ties in the civil rights movement gained speed and 
privately made its way to the governor’s office as well. In a telegram to the Police 
Department, dated 4 February 1958 and entitled “Sputnik,” M. G. Lowman, 
Executive Secretary to Circuit Riders Inc. included a long and detailed list of the 
various so-called communist ties and affiliations of the staff of Philander Smith 
College in Little Rock. He included such names as the member of faculty Lee Lorch 
(who had also testified in Congressional hearings and during the investigation of the 
Commonwealth College back in the thirties) and Grace Lorch, and the college 
president M. Lafayette Harris.296 Asking Faubus, “Are we to regard as coincidental 
the Communist affiliations and relationships of these individuals, whose public 
records are attached hereto?,” he warned that:  
Every sputnik requires a launching platform. Whether or not M. 
Lafayette Harris, and the administration leaders at Philander Smith 
College, claim unwitting use of a church-connected institution, the fact 
still remains that a Little Rock church-connected college has been a 
launching platform for an Arkansas Sputnik.297 
 
Around the same time the magazine The Confidential dug up Faubus’s 
Commonwealth story, and published an article entitled “The Commies Trained 
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Governor Faubus.”298 The article condemned Faubus saying that “he handed to the 
Communists the handsomest gift they could possibly have received from any 
American.” It gave a detailed history of the College and mentioned how it was 
“accused before an Arkansas Joint Legislative Committee of being a nest of ‘free 
love’ in the Communist tradition of disregarding ordinary standards of sexual 
morality,” closed in 1940, but still stood “listed as ‘subversive and Communist’ by 
the Attorney General of the United States and it stands condemned as pro-Soviet by 
the House Un-American Activities Committee.” 299 It stated how well-entrenched 
Faubus’s connections had been in the college as the head of a student body or as the 
principal speaker at a May Day celebration. The main argument was that Faubus’s 
actions greatly helped Soviet propaganda, and “alienated half the world’s peoples 
against USA.”300 It expressed suspicions about Faubus’s sincerity, in both his stance 
in Little Rock and public explanations about his naiveté in being involved in 
Commonwealth, it stated that: 
 He was a full-grown man of 25 and he had been teaching school for 
seven years when he went to Commonwealth. Just five months before he 
was elected president of the student body the Legislative committee had 
begun its investigation of the place and news of its probe had been 
trumpeted to every corner of Arkansas.301  
 
 The following month, a photo editorial in Ebony, pointed to the climaxed 
southern fears about a racial and political threat and wrote: 
“Our two most vexing problems,” said a Dixiecrat at a what-shall-we-
do-with-them-now meeting, are “moons and coons.” To put it less 
crudely the Southerner was referring to the twin dangers that threaten 
his supremacy: red rockets flying over his head and black neighbors 
moving in next door.302 
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The letters he received, the resurfacing of his communist ties, and climaxing 
tendency in the South to use a Cold War rhetoric, contributed to his elevated 
segregationist and anti-communist stance. In August of the same year, the anti-
communist and segregationist Attorney General Bruce Bennett offered a set of bills 
in a special session of the legislature aimed at the NAACP, in which sixteen 
interposition bills were enacted.303 He reintroduced Gregory’s affidavit law as part of 
his anti-NAACP package and it was adopted as Act 10, which required state 
employees to list all their organizational affiliations of the past five years and 
declared it illegal for employees to be affiliated with communist front organizations 
(NAACP included). The session also adopted Act 115, which directly outlawed 
public employment of NAACP members.304 Faubus signed all the bills enacted in the 
session into law, a few hours after the Court handed down Cooper v. Aaron. As 
Woods also noted, both Acts 10 and 115 “were extremely popular among Arkansas 
conservatives and meshed conveniently with Governor Faubus’s move to the 
right.”305 The  
The law which authorized the governor to close any school threatened by 
violence and integration was also enacted in that same session. Faubus used this 
authority granted to him, again a few hours after the Supreme Court decision, and 
closed four public schools.306 The re-opening of schools in 1959 would again be 
owing to a grassroots organization, bringing together a strong but belated alliance - a 
progressive group of women called The Women’s Emergency Committee, who were 
perhaps the only sincere proponents of racial justice, and a group of business leaders 
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who, like all moderates, had been silent during the building up of the crisis but 
finally decided to act upon realizing the damaging impact of closed schools in the 
state. In Arkansas and elsewhere in the upper South, closed schools were gradually 
opposed and the Massive Resistance movement began to disintegrate. State 
governments increasingly withdrew from the issue and left local authorities to settle 
their own disputes. As they retreated from the doctrine of interposition, however, the 
Massive Resistance left the legacy of “token desegregation”.307 Many schools came 
to be regarded officially as desegregated schools, in spite of the very few numbers of 
African Americans. The pace of integration was also slowed down through 
bureaucratization. As the attention turned to the even more eventful integration 
attempts in the Deep South, and the Alabama Governor George Wallace was 
climbing in his popularity with his strongly segregationist and anti-communist 
stance, Faubus went on and won four more elections, with, as Reed put it, “the 
momentum...[and] became a man of the right for the rest of his life.” While even 
Wallace would apologize for “the harm he had caused,” Faubus would never admit 
he had caused any.308  
The coming of the Cold War had rather complex influences on the various 
players in Arkansas. It encouraged the federal government to act in favor of the civil 
rights advocates, and supplied for the movement a favorable environment for 
international appeal. However, as the whole Little Rock episode showed, it also 
discouraged moderate state officials to act, and made it easier for the Massive 
Resistance movement to reach out to the otherwise silent and convertible grassroots. 
Thus, anti-communist feelings intensified by the Cold War did speed up the process 
of elimination of moderate politics in the local scope and the elimination of all liberal 
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politics in national scope. It did hurt the civil rights struggle and federal attempts to 
help it, by giving one more effective tool to the white resistance and seriously 
slowing down the pace of progress.  
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